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COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS  
ASSOCIATED WITH  
LOCAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERAITON 
 
Sarin Adhikari 
May 8, 2015 
 
Metropolitan fragmentation is considered the root cause of inequality among local 
governments. Self-governing localities have the power to exercise zoning and land-use 
laws to lock up their resources, which gives them a competitive edge against their 
neighbors. Localities are unique in terms of their economic capacity, fiscal strength, 
geographic location, racial makeup of their residents and their income status. Such 
differences reflect into variation in preference for urban infrastructure and the capacity of 
local governments to provide preferred services at the lowest possible taxes and fees. 
Some scholars have suggested consolidating localities into large regional governments to 
overcome such inequalities. However, studies focused on consolidated regional 
governments show that they have not been successful in fulfilling their promises. This 
manuscript is predicated on the argument that production of urban services need not be 
competitive as its provision, and localities can reap benefits of scale-economy and 
standardization of services through voluntary mutual cooperation and policy coordination 
without having to abdicate their rights of self-governance. The purpose of this manuscript 
vi 
 
is to identify various economic, political, social, and geographic characteristics of 
localities that influence the extent of cooperation among them. This manuscript intends to 
do that by using aggregate data and quantitative methods designed to overcome 
weaknesses faced by previous studies. 
The data used for this analysis comes from 1,164 general purpose local 
governments–cities, municipalities, counties, and townships–within 51 largest 
metropolitan statistical areas in the United States. It uses robust linear regression to 
identify causal relationship between variables representing local economic, social, 
political, and geographic characteristics and the extent of interlocal cooperation among 
localities.  Metropolitan fragmentation, growth in the developmental sector, fiscal stress, 
poverty, and the senior population are found to positively influence local governments’ 
decision to cooperate with their neighbors. Conversely, property value, growth in 
manufacturing sector, higher percentage of whites and the rich are found to negatively 
influence cooperation decisions. Similarly, localities in close proximity are found to 
engage less in interlocal cooperation, whereas African-American population is found to 
have no substantial influence on cooperation decisions. Besides, cities and municipalities 
are found to engage more in interlocal cooperation than counties, and localities in the 
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 The political geography of metropolitan America is highly fragmented. According 
to the 2012 Census of Governments, there are altogether 90,056 local governments in the 
United States. Forty three percent (38,910) of those are general-purpose governments, 
and 56 percent (51,146) are special–purpose governments. The population1 of the United 
States as estimated by the American Community Survey for the year 2012 was 
309,138,711, which suggests that one local government serves approximately 3000 
people in this country.  Public-choice theory adequately explains why so many local 
governments exist. The Tiebout model of population distribution suggests that 
proliferation of local governments within metropolitan geography results from peoples’ 
preference for specific bundles of urban services and infrastructure. Tiebout claims that 
local jurisdictions seek to attract wealthy residents by providing them lucrative bundles of 
urban services and taxes (Tiebout, 1956). As much as numerous small autonomous 
jurisdictions are praised for their responsiveness to their citizens’ preferences, efficiency 
in service provision, self-determination, fiscal accountability, and political representation, 
they are equally despised for inequality, spillover costs, and unresponsive attitudes 
towards policy externalities (ACIR, 1985, 1987; Downs, 1994; Miller, Miranda, Roque, 
& Wilf, 1995; Nice, 1987; Oakerson, 1999; Parks & Oakerson, 1989, 1993). Various 
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urban problems — racial imbalance, economic inequality, protection of privileges, 
exploitation of central cities by their suburbs, inner-city isolation, lack of affordable 
housing, accessibility to urban services, traffic congestion, lack of rational land use, 
commitment to environmental values, air and water pollution, and excessive loss of open 
space —  have been associated with metropolitan fragmentation resulting from autonomy 
and self-governance (Downs, 1994; Ross & Levine, 1996).  
For over thirty years urban scholars have focused their research on various models 
of metropolitan governance with a unitary objective of finding solutions to the problems 
arising from fragmentation and segregation (Dodge, 1996; Orfield, 1997a, 1997b; Rusk, 
1993, 1999; Savitch & Vogel, 2000). There is a general consensus that a regional solution 
is needed to solve those problems, but scholars are divided on which model of regional 
governance is the most appropriate. The divide boils down to the dichotomy between 
regional government and regional governance. The proponents of regional government 
envision an overarching area-wide consolidated metropolitan government as an ideal 
model. They also suggest an alternative model of multi-tiered nested government where 
complete consolidation is difficult to achieve (Norris, 2001; Rusk, 1993, 1999). 
Metropolitan governance, on the other hand, focuses on functionally overlapping, cross-
cutting, and flexible cooperative networks between localities, thereby forming a regional 
ecosystem without the rigidity of an overarching administrative structure (Feiock, 2009; 
Feiock, Tao, & Johnson, 2004; Oakerson, 2004; Parks & Oakerson, 1989, 2000; Savitch 
& Vogel, 2000).  
Structural reform is less popular among urban voters (Carr & Feiock, 1999; 
Walker, 1987). Reforms such as consolidation of city and county governments have not 
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been successful in keeping all of the promises made for improved efficiency, economic 
growth, fiscal improvement, and equity (Blomquist & Parks, 1995; Carr & Feiock, 1999; 
Feiock, Carr, & Johnson, 2006; Kelly & Adhikari, 2013; Rosentraub, 2000; H.V. Savitch, 
Vogel, & Ye, 2010). Regional governmental structures that use command-and-control 
mechanisms are also considered ineffective (Polanyi, 1998) because they accrue higher 
transaction costs (Oakerson, 2004).   
Governance without a government, on the other hand, has been attributed as the 
easiest method for regional collective action; and governance through a network of 
voluntary interlocal cooperation is considered to be the easiest of them all (Savitch & 
Vogel, 2000; Walker, 1987). Parks and Oakerson believe that metropolitan governance 
can occur without metropolitan government even in highly fragmented metropolitan areas 
(Oakerson, 1999; Parks & Oakerson, 2000). Even though jurisdictions compete for the 
provision of urban services and infrastructures, the production of those services need not 
be an outcome of a competitive process (Howell-Moroney, 2008; V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & 
Warren, 1961). Cooperation and competition among jurisdictions are not mutually 
exclusive. Jurisdictions can as easily decide to cooperate or collaborate with one another 
on production and simultaneously compete on provision of services (V. Ostrom et al., 
1961). While provision decisions are political in nature, production decisions are purely 
economic.  
Fragmented metropolitan areas are envisioned to be composed of a number of 
provision and production units competing as well as cooperating with one another 
thereby forming a complex local public economy (Oakerson, 1999). Besides, cooperative 
networks among competing jurisdictions have been seen not only in producing urban 
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services, but also in planning and developing major infrastructure improvements such as 
ports, airports, business parks, and convention centers (Feiock et al., 2004; Wallis, 
1994c).   
 
What Is Interlocal Cooperation? 
 Interlocal cooperation can be defined as effort for collective action between two 
or more local government entities for service delivery, economic development, land-use 
planning, environment protection, and mutually beneficial policies. Depending on their 
nature, common local policies can be broadly classified as those involving mutual action 
and/or coordination in production and/or provision of urban services and infrastructure 
(constructive policies) and mutual policies that are focused on compensating for any 
negative externalities impacting other jurisdictions (restorative policies). For localities to 
engage in cooperation with one another, the transaction cost of participating in such an 
endeavor needs to be sufficiently low (North, 1990; Williamson, 1979, 1981), and 
localities need to be willing to reciprocate on the cooperative actions of their neighbors 
(Axelrod & Bennett, 1993; Axelrod, 1984; E. Ostrom, 1998). The easiest approaches to 
regional service delivery by Walker (1987) include informal cooperation, interlocal 
service contracts, and joint power agreements. Similarly, Oakerson (1999) has suggested 
in-house production, coordinated production, joint production, intergovernmental 
contracting, private contracting, franchising, and vouchering as different ways to link 
provision to production. Cooperation forged through a binding contract is considered 
formal, and the one not documented formally is informal – also called the handshake deal 
(Post, 2002). Informal agreements are perpetuated on the grounds of reciprocity of action 
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and mutual trust between participants (Post, 2002; Walker, 1987).  Interlocal service 
contracts are voluntary formal agreements popular among local governments in 
metropolitan regions (Walker, 1987). Joint power agreements are formal arrangements 
between two or more local governments for joint planning, financing, and delivery of 
services to citizens of the participating jurisdictions (Walker, 1987).  
Formal contracts are more stable and less risky to the participants. However, 
short-term, ad hoc relationships provide the flexibility for localities to quickly retreat 
from a less beneficial relationship and enter into a different one that provides better 
outcomes. Additionally, Post (2002) classifies collective action as one that involves 
exchange of funds and one that involves bartering services with no financial transaction. 
A local government might exchange a service in return for another service of equal value 
rendered by a neighboring locality and, hence, avoid exchanging funds. In another case, a 
group of localities might cooperatively decide to set uniform local tax rates across the 
region that also do not necessarily require monetary exchange.  Relationships that include 
exchange of funds are more easily quantifiable than those that do not. 
 
Need for Interlocal Cooperation 
 The primary reason for interlocal cooperation is that localities have nothing to 
gain from unyielding competition.  Conventional theory suggest that local jurisdictions 
must be in competition with each other to gain elite interests and therby enhance fiscal 
conditions at the expense of the others (Tiebout, 1956). The competition is so severe that 
cities must constantly seek investment in developmental infrastructure and explore 
various tactics to reduce taxes to look attractive to potential residents and businesses. 
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Cities are forced to pursue developmental initiatives regardless of whether these policies 
are the most beneficial (Peterson, 1981).  
However, local competition is a zero-sum game in which one jurisdiction loses 
while the other wins. To keep winning the competitive game, localities risk large 
investments on potentially attractive projects and make unprofitable deals with big 
businesses in anticipation of future benefits. Extravagant competitive spending and 
astronomical debts accrued in the process put localities on a downward spiral often 
referred to as a race-to-the-bottom (Savitch, Kantor, & Vicari, 2002).  
Furthermore, studies have shown that localities in city centers and suburbs are 
economically linked and share a common economic fate. Suburbs cannot thrive if their 
central cities are withering (Ledebur & Barnes, 1992; Savitch, Collins, Sanders, & 
Markham, 1993; Voith, 1998). Localities sharing a regional geography are economically 
connected to a common regional market that thrives when all units in the region have 
healthy economies (Barnes & Ledebur, 1998).  
 In the current era of globalization, metropolitan regions from around the world 
compete for economic resources. Since localities are the building-blocks of metropolitan 
regions, globalization puts them in direct competition with their peers from around the 
world for specialized services and labor-intensive jobs (Barnes & Ledebur, 1998; Sassen, 
1991; Short, 2004). Fragmented economic resources and competitive attitudes among 
localities limit the ability of the metropolitan regions to compete with their global 
counterparts. Other social and political problems at the local level also affect global 
competitiveness of city-regions. Localities are better off collaborating with one another to 
reap collective benefits gained by attracting global resources (Dodge, 1990, 1996).  
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 Cost saving through economies of scale has been cited as strong rationale for 
cities to cooperate (J. Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Sonenblum, 
Kirlin, & Ries, 1977; Stein, 1990). In a study conducted by the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), more than half of the respondent cities mentioned 
economies of scale as the primary reason for entering into a regional coalition (ACIR, 
1985). Whereas localities can decide to jointly produce urban services to achieve scale 
economy, smaller localities unable to produce capital-intensive services can also ensure 
service continuity by cooperating with a larger neighboring locality (Post, 2002). Use of 
cooperative methods for continued access to desired urban services has been documented 
by Ugboro et al. as well (Ugboro, Obeng, & Talley, 2001). 
 Cities can internalize both positive and negative cross-border spillovers by 
enacting common policies (Feiock, 2007). They can also get compensated for lost 
revenues resulting from cross-border inequalities by a cooperative system of revenue 
sharing among neighboring jurisdictions (Pack, 1998; Rothenberg, 1992). Improvement 
of business climate and the ability to capture wandering businesses has been suggested as 
strong motivation for interlocal cooperation (Nunn & Rosentraub, 1997). 
 Interlocal cooperation is also considered a viable option for localities to relieve 
their fiscal stress and enhance their fiscal capacity. Local governments can enhance their 
fiscal capacity by dumping costly in-house production in favor of a joint production 
structure (ACIR, 1985). Scale economy and access to relatively cheap services can help 
move low-service, high-tax communities toward a more competitively priced bundle of 
services (Miller et al., 1995). According to Miller (1995), communities with high tax 
effort and low tax yield are considered to be in the state of fiscal stress. Joint planning, 
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changes in incompatible land uses, uniform tax rates (or shared revenue), and 
standardized urban services create a leveled playing field among neighboring localities 
thereby reducing disparity among them. Residents and businesses, then, have fewer 
incentives to relocate thereby improving tax yield of previously stressed localities. 
Standardizing services and minimizing spatial disparity can help recovery in hollowing 
city centers thus improving overall regional competitiveness (Liebman, Herman, 
Williams, & Dye, 1963). 
 
Unanswered Questions about Interlocal Cooperation 
 Fragmented governments in metropolitan regions are considered the leading cause 
of socioeconomic variations between localities. Fragmentation perpetuates the status quo 
which is structurally supported homogenous segregation. It is natural to conclude that 
what has caused metropolitan areas to fragment is also what prevents them from 
engaging in a collective action.  Urbanists strongly agree that citizens have unequal needs 
and preferences and they prefer to segregate in fragmented communities (ACIR, 1987; 
Nice, 1987), that fragmentation causes competition between localities (Post, 2004a; 
Tiebout, 1956), and that fragmented localities find it difficult to cooperate. However, 
studies have also found that competition and cooperation can coexist (Feiock, 2004; E. 
Ostrom, 1990, 2000) and that localities cooperate with one another even when 
competition is the accepted norm (Goetz & Kayser, 1993). Some studies claim that 
fragmentation does not negatively impact interlocal cooperation (Feiock et al., 2004) and 
even take the argument a step further suggesting that fragmentation increases probability 
of cooperation by simply increasing the number of potential collaborators (Campbell & 
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Glynn, 1990). The very nature of fragmentation by preferential sorting suggests that 
localities that share a common geography do not necessarily share characteristic 
similarities. It is important to understand how local characteristics affect interlocal 
cooperation and to identify why some localities with certain characteristics cooperate 
more than others.  
Earlier literature on interlocal relationships suggest that localities are the building 
blocks of the local public economy that interact in a regional common market (Barnes & 
Ledebur, 1998; Oakerson, 1999; Parks & Oakerson, 1989), but the literature fails to 
discuss how characteristic variations of these localities affect their ability to contribute in 
the regional marketplace. The transaction-cost theory builds a purely economic argument 
based on relative cost of engaging into cooperation (Williamson, 1979), but it does not 
elaborate on what constitutes the variation in transaction costs. Extant literature suggests 
that transaction costs can be minimized by smaller group sizes (number of localities 
engaged in cooperation), smaller jurisdictions, closer proximity, and contiguity (Ferris & 
Graddy, 1991; Liebman et al., 1963; Olson, 1971; Post, 2002; Williamson, 1979), but it 
does not elaborate on the role of socio-economic and political characteristics of localities 
on their decision to engage in collective action. 
Scholars have suggested that racial variations (Feiock et al., 2004; Ferris & 
Graddy, 1986; Post, 2004a) and fiscal condition of localities (Downs, 1994; Ferris & 
Graddy, 1986; K. A. Foster, 1997; Haughwout, 1999; Heeg, Klagge, & OssenbrÜGge, 
2003; Sonenblum et al., 1977) possibly influence interlocal cooperation. Outcomes from 
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 This manuscript is predicated on the assumption that ad hoc cooperation between 
local governments is the path to metropolitan governance, and the success of such 
cooperative governance depends on the ease of forming cooperative networks. Every 
jurisdiction has a unique set of socio-economic characteristics that influences its 
cooperative relationships with its neighbors. The body of literature on interlocal relations 
and its role in building cooperative regional governance is very strong. Studies shed light 
on the influence of the characteristic uniqueness of localities on interlocal cooperation, 
but most of them are focused on specific metropolitan areas. Some of them are very old, 
and others fail to provide conclusive findings. The literature lacks large aggregate 
analysis on interlocal relations based on recent data and robust quantitative methods 
producing conclusive results that can be trustfully generalized. This manuscript is an 
attempt to fill that void.   This research attempts to answer the question, “Why do some 
localities cooperate more than others?” 
Additionally, this research explores how variations among fragmented localities 
affect their desire and capacity to cooperate with their neighbors. It also addresses why 
some localities cooperate more than others. This research identifies stereotypes of 
localities for further research and academic discussions. The literature on regionalism has 
established that regional governance does not have a one-size-fits-all model. The 
outcome of this study will help policy makers to adopt appropriate models of regional 
collective action that are suitable and acceptable to specific localities. With proper 
understanding of influence of local characteristics on metropolitan collective action, 
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customized governance models will have a higher probability of success compared to 
existing coercive methods. 
 This document is divided into six chapters. A brief explanation of the problem 
and its background is provided in the introduction. Chapter two reviews the literature and 
theoretical constructs regarding the subject matter. Chapter three explains the research 
methods and develops hypotheses to be tested. Chapter four provides a summary of the 
research findings. Chapter five provides discussion of the findings and chapter six lays 








LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 Scholars contend that regional  governance in metropolitan areas is necessary to 
reap the benefits of economy of scale in the provision of urban services. Regional 
governance is more equitable due to  standardization of area-wide policies and is able to  
internalize policy spillovers—both positive and negative—across jurisdictional 
boundaries. However, scholars have differences of opinion regarding appropriate paths to 
regionalism. This chapter reviews arguments made in favor of polycentric, as well as 
monocentric, organization of localities and governing metropolitan areas through 
restructuring of metropolitan government versus non-structural metropolitan governance. 
In conclusion, the chapter makes a logical move toward the need for metropolitan 
governance through interlocal cooperation and identifies gaps in the literature in this 
arena. 
 
Divided Schools of Thought about Regional Collective Action 
 Throughout modern history, cities have adopted various regional measures to 
solve local problems. According to Wallis, there have been three major waves of 
regionalism (Wallis, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c).  The first wave sought solutions at the local 
level, generally by restructuring regional government through annexations and complete 
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or partial consolidations. Most of the consolidation of large metropolises such as New 
Orleans (1805), Boston (1821), Philadelphia (1854), San Francisco (1856), and New 
York (1874-1898), took place in the nineteenth century, all of them by legislative action 
(Wallis, 1994b). During the twentieth century, the main idea for local governmental 
restructuring was based on a simple assumption that too many local governments reduced 
the effectiveness of metropolitan governance, which needs to be replaced by consolidated 
regional governments. The focus of those consolidations was to strengthen the regional 
government by broadening the tax base to the greatest possible extent and to prevent 
revenue loss caused by extra jurisdictional migration.  
Proponents of the monocentric model of regional governance believe that urban 
regions with a strong central government that are able to blanket the entire region with 
standardized policies are better able to address urban problems compared to their 
fragmented counterparts (Aron, 1969; Peirce, Johnson, & Hall, 1993; Rusk, 1993, 1999, 
2003; Wood, 1961). Rusk uses the term “elastic” cities to define jurisdictions that are 
able to expand their existing boundaries to encompass outlying communities so as to 
bring the entire region under one policy umbrella. According to Wallis (1994), between 
1950 and 1970 Atlanta quadrupled in size, Dallas and Fort Worth grew to more than 
double their size, San Jose jumped from 17 to 140 square miles, and Phoenix expanded 
from 17 to almost 250 square miles. Though most of these territorial expansions were a 
result of major cities annexing unincorporated areas, a number of instances where smaller 
independent cities consolidated with a neighboring major city have also been reported. 
With the  exceptions of Denver city – Denver County, Honolulu city – Honolulu County, 
and the city and county of Broomfield (Colorado), all consolidations that took place in 
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the twentieth century happened by referendum. Notably, between 1921 and 2010, there 
were a total of 164 attempts of city-county consolidations of which voters approved only 
thirty four (Murphy, 2012). Even with a success rate of just about 20 percent, proponents 
of consolidation still believe it is the most appropriate model of regional governance 
(Carver, 1973; Filer & Kenny, 1980; Foster, Gonzalez, & Chappell Jr., 1981; Gorton, 
1978; B. W. Hawkins, Ward, & Becker, 1991; Leland & Thurmaier, 2000; S. M. Leland 
& Thurmaier, 2010; Lyons & Lowery, 1989; Peirce et al., 1993; Rosentraub, 2000; Rusk, 
1993, 1999). They tend to focus more on benefits of coordinated and equitable services 
and enhanced regional economic competitiveness.  
As with the case presented by Wallis (1994b), most of the late eighteenth-century 
and early and mid–nineteenth-century approaches to regionalism was more about 
centralization as a response to fragmentation. An ideal situation according to 
consolidationists would be a unified regional government with area-wide powers. 
However, supporters of monocentric models also agree that such an ideal situation is far 
from reality. This explains their continued support for incomplete consolidations, partial 
mergers, and other forms of multitier restructuring (Norris, 2001; Orfield, 1997a). Norris 
(2001) paints a gloomier picture of American metropolitics believing that localities will 
continue to fragment and urban problems will continue to exacerbate in the foreseeable 
future without any possible resolution. Norris (2001) argues that state and federal 
intervention may be necessary to create a multi-tiered formally structured government to 
deal with some issues.  
Difficulty in achieving consolidated regional governments through referendums is 
probably the reason behind many reform scholars advocating for state and federal 
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intervention on local issues. Wallis (1994b) calls it the second wave of regionalism. 
Massive influx of federal money for infrastructure development—primarily 
transportation—and mandatory requirements for regional planning and coordinated area-
wide development brought federally brokered institutions like Council of Governments 
(COGs) and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) into the regional limelight. 
Despite having an undertone of regional-type institution, they had a fragmented core-
structure made up of local representatives coerced for forced collaboration. Competition 
for federal grants soon rekindled rivalry among participating localities.  
By the 1990s while some reform scholars had given up on metropolitan 
regionalism because of numerous failed consolidation attempts and increasing 
fragmentation due to local autonomy (Norris, 2001), others were busy evaluating 
outcomes of various reform experiments that took place in the last century. Metropolitan 
consolidation and multi tiered reform are the flagship models of the old regionalism. 
Over the period of the last four decades, scholars have studied these models to examine 
their effectiveness. Most of them report little or no achievement of the promised 
outcomes (Benton & Gamble, 1984; Blomquist & Parks, 1995; Brierly, 2004; Carr, Bae, 
& Lu, 2006; Carr & Feiock, 1999; Clarke, 2006; Feiock, 2004; Feiock & Carr, 1997; 
Hutcheson & Prather, 1979; Reese, 2004; Rogers & Lipsey, 1974; Savitch & Vogel, 
2000, 2004; Seamon & Feiock, 1995; Selden & Campbell, 2000).  
Feiock (2004) claims that city-county consolidations fail to produce the intended 
results due to the compromises made in order to pass the consolidation initiative. These 
compromises often stripped away the basic powers needed to address inequity.  Similarly, 
Brierly (2004) claims that government centralization through consolidation simply 
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increases transaction costs both within and between local governments. This argument is 
further supported by Savitch and Vogel (2000). They concluded that the functional 
linkages between localities in the Louisville metropolitan region (before consolidation) 
created an environment of mutual trust that was necessary for collective action. They did 
not expect localities to be trusting and respectful of each other if any form of 
consolidation was forced on them.  
Reformists generally claim improvement in fiscal health, better economic 
conditions, benefits due to economy of  scale, standardization and efficiency in service 
provision, responsive governments, and improvement in quality of life as possible 
outcomes of local government reform. They provide a strong theoretical argument that 
consolidated governments should improve local conditions; but those hypotheses are 
rarely quantitatively supported (Gorton, 1978; Hawkins et al., 1991; Leland & 
Thurmaier, 2010; Rosentraub, 2000). Leland and Thurmaier (2000) contend that 
consolidation improves fiscal health and budgetary accountability based on their study of 
Kansas City and Wyandotte County, but the analytical underpinnings do not seem 
sufficient and strong. Kelly and Adhikari (2013), using a time-series information on 
Louisville and Jefferson County find marginal improvement in fiscal health as a result of 
consolidation.  
Claims about benefits of consolidation in service provision through scale 
economy and better citizen responsiveness (Carver, 1973; Foster et al., 1981; Lyons & 
Lowery, 1989) are yet to be quantitatively supported. According to the study done by 
Hutcheson and Prather (1979), with the increase in size of the regional government 
comes an inflated bureaucracy that makes scale economies unlikely. In fact Carver’s 
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claim about government–responsiveness using a citizen survey done just five years after 
the consolidation of Jacksonville city and Duval county might have been a little too early 
to provide a realistic picture.  
Governmental reforms have been found to shake things up in the first few years of 
change. Reese (2004) argues that even though consolidation might stir up the regional 
economy in the beginning, it fails to create lasting and noticeable change to an average 
voter. A citizen survey carried out (after twelve years of consolidation) in a small town 
outside Nashville City-Davidson County and a comparable neighborhood within the 
urban services district showed considerably higher satisfaction with the local government 
in the small town than in the urban-service district (Rogers & Lipsey, 1974).  
Another argument popular among reformists is the reduction of fragmentation, 
uniformity of taxes, and lowering of government expenditures as a result of 
consolidation. However, Benton and Gamble (1984) provide quantitative evidence that 
there was no reduction in property taxes or expenditures even after fifteen years of the 
consolidation of city of Jacksonville and Duval County. On a similar note, Blomquist and 
Parks (1995) report little evidence of reduction in taxing units as well as in complexity of 
governmental structure even after twenty four years of Indianapolis City-Marion County 
consolidation. 
There are similar failure stories on the economic-development front as well. 
Seamon and Feiock (1995), Feiock and Carr (1997; 1999) find no effect of the 
Jacksonville-Duval consolidation on its economic development. Similarly, Carr et al. 
(2006) found no effect of consolidation on economic growth when they compared data 
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from consolidated Lexington City-Fayette County with that of Louisville City-Jefferson 
County before their consolidation in 2003.  
Consolidationists also claim that the reform models are better able to achieve 
fiscal redistribution across urban regions. It is theorized that monocentric reform brings 
localities under a common policy umbrella thus allowing for easy revenue transfers and 
expenditures on redistributive programs. Consolidation is also suggested to be a primary 
vehicle for transferring wealth from suburbs to the city (Filer & Kenny, 1980; Rusk, 
2003). However, Blomquist and Parks (1995) have found little evidence of financial 
redistribution through more than twenty years after the birth of Indianapolis Unigov. 
Forced redistribution is probably a weakness rather than strength of consolidation. 
Scholars have reported further migration of residents into outer suburbs and leapfrogging 
exurbs as a result of such policies (Barnes & Ledebur, 1998; Downs, 1994). The regional 
government cannot exercise its power of “elasticity” quick enough to engulf new border 
towns. Some metropolitan regions have waited decades to get public mandate for 
consolidated governments. This simply suggests that consolidation attempts are not 
popular among voters and they spur new extra jurisdictional development at the 
perimeter, thus aggravating the problem it was designed to resolve. 
Besides its failure to keep its promises, scholars have reported local governmental 
reform to be strongly associated with reduced citizen participation in local decision 
making. Seamon and Feiock (1995) have reported reduced voter participation in local 
elections after the Jacksonville-Duval consolidation. On a similar note, Clarke (2006) 
also reported dilution of minority political power resulting from Louisville-Jefferson 
County consolidation.  
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Regionalism through Cooperation and Coordination 
The examples presented in the previous section are sufficient to make a case that 
regionalism through local governmental reform is an expensive and a laborious exercise 
in vain. It is not very difficult to see why scholarly attention shifted from structure to 
process, from governing to capacity building, and from government to governance 
(Wallis, 1994c). Tiebout had already provided a strong explanation of regional 
fragmentation through the application of micro-economic theory on urban localities 
(Tiebout, 1956). This led to an understanding that fragmentation and segregation are the 
result of self-sorting populations based on their likes and wants. Reformists’ claim about 
achieving economy of scale through governmental consolidation came under theoretical 
scrutiny when Ostrom et al. (1961) argued that scale economies for different urban 
services are obtained at different levels. Therefore, an area-wide consolidation might not 
always be the most efficient way of governing an urban region. With the distinction 
between production and provision units (ACIR, 1987), various urban services could be 
(theoretically) unbundled and different levels of scale economy could be realized. This 
distinction allowed urban governance to be viewed more as a self-organizing local public 
economy (Oakerson, 1999; Parks & Oakerson, 1989) than a random crazy-quilt bunch of 
fiercely competing local governments.  
Parks and Oakerson suggest that regionalism is better achieved through 
cooperation and coordination among already existing local governments rather than 
creating area-wide structures. Wherever necessary, localities can choose to create 
functionally cross-cutting regional bodies with specific responsibilities. Encouraging 
cooperation on pressing urban issues and creating local networks between existing 
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governmental institutions have been suggested as the most appropriate and the easiest 
paths to regional governance (Feiock, 2009; Savitch & Vogel, 2000; Walker, 1987).  
Savitch and Vogel call this phenomenon new-regionalism.  
The failure stories of old regionalism were probably the final nails in the coffin, 
which renewed scholarly interest in cooperative governance through voluntary 
participation of urban governments. Consolidated governments are getting internally 
fragmented as they embark upon creating new independent public authorities such as in 
the cases of Jacksonville and Indianapolis Unigov (Savitch & Vogel, 1996). Savitch and 
Vogel also claim that despite having area-wide powers, consolidated governments avoid 
introducing harsh policies to avoid public outcry. Hence, much is left for localities to 
decide for themselves, to which localities have responded by cooperating and 
coordinating in the least controversial ways (Savitch &Vogel,1996). 
Of the seventeen different variants of regional collective action listed by Walker 
(1987), methods that require governmental reform populate the tough end of the spectrum 
while regional approaches to urban-service delivery through informal cooperation, 
interlocal service contracts, and joint power agreements   are considered to be the easiest 
ones. On a similar note, Savitch and Vogel (2000) introduce the Linked Function model 
and Complex Networks model as closest realization to governance without government.  
Linked function is described as a form of functional consolidation through 
interlocal service agreements in which a city and its county can mutually choose to 
delegate specific functions such as economic development or waste disposal, to be 
governed in an area-wide basis. Governments can also add or remove more functions 
through mutual agreements to include revenue sharing or for other forms of redistribution 
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as applicable to them. This model allows for local governments to maintain their 
autonomy on certain policy issues while collaborating on others.  
While the linked function model assumes regional fragmentation as something 
that needs to be addressed through seemingly partial consolidation, the complex networks 
model considers fragmentation to be the cause to increase potential for cooperative 
governance. According to Savitch and Vogel, a large number of independent local 
governments can voluntarily cooperate through multiple overlapping networks of 
interlocal agreements. This complex web of cooperation allows for numerous service 
arrangements of various types to choose from while maintaining citizen control over each 
one of them. This model calls for a self-organizing and organic form of governance. Also 
known as complex arrays, this model consists of provision units such as municipalities, 
townships, counties, and special districts together with public authorities, and private 
contractors forming a local public economy (ACIR, 1987).   
However, skeptics of these models believe that regionalism through cooperative 
governance can never be successful because of one simple reason:  independent localities 
might just stop cooperating thus removing the parameter that the entire model is based on 
(Norris, 2001). Norris also points to the practical difficulties faced by localities when 
their governing officials are replaced and they need to engage in negotiations again. 
Savitch and Vogel (2000) themselves agree that self-direction may lead to no direction 
and localities might revert back to maintaining the status quo.  
Theories on cooperation, however, suggest that localities will cooperate as long as 
conditions for cooperation are met (Axelrod, 1984; Williamson, 1979); hence skepticism 
about continued cooperation or the future of cooperative networks is irrelevant. 
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Anticipating for the stability of interlocal networks undermine the randomness and 
organic character of interlocal cooperation as suggested by the complex networks model. 
As long as conditions for cooperation are met, localities will cooperate. However, if 
conditions are not favorable and collective action needs to be forced on them 
(presumably by a third party), it is equivalent to reverting to the reform model through 
formation of some form of institutionalized regional government.  
 
Conditions for Interlocal Cooperation 
Theories on interlocal relationships emphasize certain conditions that encourage 
and ensure interlocal cooperation. According to Olson (1971), Axelrod (1984), and later 
Coleman (1990), the first step toward cooperation is the realization that benefits from 
such endeavors exist. It is easier to realize collective benefits in urban services requiring 
large-scale investments such as solid-waste disposal and waste-water treatment, or asset-
specific seasonal services such as snow removal and road maintenance; however, mutual 
benefits are not easily visible in issues related to land uses, parks and recreation, and tax 
policies. That is probably why skeptics of cooperative governance are concerned that 
interlocal cooperation is achieved easily in “systems maintenance” services but not in 
“lifestyle” services (Howell-Moroney, 2008; Norris, 2001; Williams, 1967). Norris 
(2001) even argues that the way localities avoid cooperating on pressing lifestyle issues 
resulting from fragmentation is the primary weakness of governance without government. 
Recent studies have shown that localities within an urban region are dependent on each 
other (Oakerson, 1999, 2004), and that the economies of central cities and suburbs are 
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interrelated. Suburbs cannot thrive if their corresponding central cities are withering 
(Savitch et al., 1993; Savitch & Vogel, 2004).  
Reciprocity is another condition for successful cooperation. According to Axelrod 
(1984), individuals (and probably institutions too) tend to reciprocate the behavior of 
their opponents under conditions of uncertainty. It takes repeated interactions with the 
same partners to build trust between the parties. Since urban jurisdictions are 
geographically fixed, both the conditions for repeat interactions and fixed partners are 
satisfied.  Hawkins and Feiock (n.d.) also substantiate the theory of reciprocity with their 
finding that prior agreements between localities influence future cooperative actions.  
Transaction-cost theory is the key to understanding cooperation among localities. 
As speculated by Norris (2001), some localities might not want to cooperate with others 
or even end a cooperative relationship. When involved parties unilaterally pursue 
defection to promote or protect their self-interest in an environment of distrust is what 
Williamson (1993) refers to as opportunism. A mutual contract requires parties to fulfill 
certain promises, and each participant bears some amount of risk that stems from other 
collaborators not fulfilling their part of the promise. According to Coleman, the risk is 
warranted as long as one expects gains by doing so, and that a decision to take such risk 
implies that the parties trust one another (Coleman, 1990). Besides the costs arising from 
individual behavior, cooperation is also dependent on the cost of production and 
management of goods and services mutually (Commons, 1931). According to Coase 
(1960) and Williamson (1979), localities compare the cost of in-house production of 
urban services with that of joint production, and as long as joint production is cheaper 
they engage in cooperation. As well as the cost of production, localities face other types 
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of transaction costs such as the cost of finding parties, the cost of negotiating agreements, 
and the cost of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the agreement (Macher & 
Richman, 2008). Additionally, public-sector transaction-costs involve time and effort 
devoted to making collective decisions, costs of elections and meetings, citizen 
participation, and time required for official action (Oakerson, 1999). When these costs 
are much higher, as Norris (2001) points out, it is difficult for localities to engage in a 
collective action.  
Monoentrists argue that reform models involve less transaction costs among 
localities since they do not rely on mutual trust between them. Scholars suggest formation 
of embedded networks among local units that are enforced through social, economic, and 
political relationships to reduce transaction costs arising from distrust and risk aversion 
(Feiock, In Won Lee, Hyung Jun Park, & Lee, 2010; Lee, Feiock, & Lee, 2012). This 
suggests that social, economic, and political characteristics of localities have some 
influence over their decision to cooperate with one another. The following section 
summarizes the theories and the scholarly works pertaining to the influence of local 
characteristics on interlocal cooperation. 
 
Cooperation and Local Characteristics 
 The theory of cooperation puts special emphasis on characteristics of the parties 
involved, and the nature of the environment they all operate within. Axelrod (1984) 
suggests that fixed characteristics of participants are associated with certain stereotypical 
behaviors. He calls them labels. Similarly, participants develop a reputation over time 
that can encourage or hinder cooperation. Localities get labelled in various ways, which 
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eventually become their identity. Rich and poor; high class, middle class, and poor 
neighborhoods; white neighborhoods and black neighborhoods; city and suburb, 
downtown and uptown, and the like. In the United States, city centers have been 
conventionally pictured as having higher concentration of blacks, poor whites, and 
working-class migrants. Central-city residential areas also connote higher instances of 
boarded-up houses, run-down neighborhoods, decaying, old industrial infrastructure, 
poor-quality urban services, poor-quality schools, drug addiction, crime, and the like, 
whereas central city business centers suggest a picture of a high-rise skyline with 
gleaming, glass-clad office buildings, hotels, convention centers, and the like.  
Suburbs, on the other hand, have an image of having lower population densities 
with large single family houses, clean environment, higher percentage of whites, more 
educated and highly skilled workforce, higher incomes, better schools, nice parks, and 
less crime. Such variations in characteristics affect cooperation among localities. 
Neighboring cities with similar population characteristics are likely to have common 
preferences for public services, and therefore are comfortable collaborating with 
localities they perceive as compatible types.  
Localities easily build trust with other localities with similar characteristics and 
preferences. According to Axelrod, a certain reputation is attached to various labels. In an 
urban context, African-American neighborhoods have reputations for harboring crime, 
poverty, drug addiction, and other socially unacceptable activities. Similarly, poor, black, 
or migrant communities are considered to demand more public services and pay fewer 
taxes. These groups are also considered to put additional stress on the health-care system 
and redistributive social programs. Thus well-endowed localities are unlikely to engage 
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in cooperation with their needy neighbors. Axelrod (1984), however, implies that 
characteristically different localities can also engage in cooperation if they build up 
sufficient trust through repeat interactions and consistent good behavior.  
 Besides drawing from the general theories of cooperation, urban literature is 
rather lean on theories explaining the effects of local characteristics on urban interlocal 
cooperation. Probably the first influential work on interlocal relations is Tiebout’s theory 
of local expenditure (Tiebout, 1956). This is, however, a model of population sorting and 
interlocal competition rather than a model for cooperation. Models of cooperation 
between fragmented localities are explained by  ACIR (1985, 1987), Parks and Oakerson 
(1989), and Oakerson (1999, 2004). These studies suggest group size (fragmentation) 
possibly influences interlocal cooperation. Oakerson (2004) and Post (2004b), building 
on the work of Olson (1971), argues that the transaction cost of interlocal cooperation 
increases with increasing group size. As the number of localities in a region increase, 
transaction costs–the cost of organization and operation–also increases. Increasing 
number of participants in regional collective action encourages some to free-ride on 
collective benefits. However, Oakerson (2004) believes that communities that are unable 
to build sufficient mutual trust and those unable to overcome the problems of free riding 
are the candidates for consolidation.  
 In addition to group size, territorial proximity is another factor that affects 
interlocal cooperation. Axelrod (1984) posits that territorially proximate neighbors 
interact more, and successful strategies spread to other subsequent jurisdictions. 
Sometimes it might be necessary for a locality to imitate certain policies adopted by its 
neighbor(s) to prevent cross-border spillover. For example, different zoning and tax 
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policies adopted by two neighboring localities might encourage residents and businesses 
to strategically move across jurisdictions to gain respective benefits provided by both. 
Tax-sharing covenants or cooperatively adopted local policies will render any strategic 
behavior by the residents unnecessary. Eventually neighboring communities may face 
similar problems and be forced to adopt similar policies. This is only true if these 
localities are characteristically similar and people are indifferent about choosing where to 
live (or run their businesses). Even though neighboring localities have different capacities 
for production and provision of urban services, proximity makes it possible for 
neighboring localities to jointly produce certain urban services and enjoy efficiency 
through scale economy. Post (2002) has reported increased probability of local 
cooperation where local government densities are higher. 
 Size and proximity are much simpler characteristics when it comes to interlocal 
relations. Parks and Oakerson (1989) and Oakerson (1999) limit their arguments to these 
physical characteristics when discussing variations between localities participating in the 
local public economy. However, localities have a differing mix of economic, social, and 
political characteristics that dictate how much capacity and willingness they have to 
contribute to the ecosystem of regional governance. Few theories are established about 
how localities having different characteristics cooperate with one other. Probably the 
closest proxy would be to use the theories of segregation, assuming that the reasons 
forcing localities to segregate are the reasons preventing them from cooperating. 
Research in the field is fairly consistent that localities segregate because of difference in 
preferences, which reflect lifestyle choices as well as economic capacities. People 
segregate into different jurisdictions according to their economic classes, racial 
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differences, and political choices. Suburban localities are generally wealthy, and city 
centers are generally poor. Wealthy localities have better schools and better employment 
opportunities, while poor localities do not. Poverty, lack of infrastructure, and lack of 
opportunities gradually convert poorer localities into crime pockets. The more this 
happens, the more families move to the suburbs and the suburbs become more segregated 
from their central cities (Burns, 1994; Downs, 1994; Ledebur & Barnes, 1992; Nivola, 
1999). It is logical to assume that local characteristics such as economic condition, fiscal 
capacity, incomes, poverty levels, education levels, racial mix, and political choices 
influence the way localities interact. In the next section, relevant scholarly works on local 
characteristics and interlocal cooperation are discussed along with their strengths and 
shortcomings. 
 
Scholarly Research on Local Characteristics and Interlocal Cooperation 
Intergovernmental relations as a field of research came into the spotlight after the 
establishment of Advisory Commission for Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) in 1959. 
Interests in local government interactions became prominent when ACIR started 
conducting custom surveys of local characteristics. Initially, the studies were more 
aligned towards city-suburban divide, metropolitan fragmentation, economic 
development, and income inequalities.  This scholarly field is still very young compared 
to economics, political science, and other social sciences. Among different streams of 
local governmental research, studies of local interactions share its platform with literature 
on economic development, policy analysis, and public administration. This body of 
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literature focuses on local competitiveness, economic growth, and fiscal capacity as well 
as race relations, inequalities, and political characteristics. 
 
Studies on Fragmentation and Interlocal Cooperation 
Fragmentation is perhaps the most studied topic by scholars of local collective 
action. Fragmentation by itself is not a local characteristic; it is a representation of 
jurisdictional proliferation in a region. However, higher fragmentation represents greater 
diversity of preferences for public policies in the region. When regions fragment, 
localities of various characteristics sort themselves within the regional geography, and 
then engage in cooperation and competition on various policy issues. Fragmentation has 
been theorized to create the potential for, as well as, hinder interlocal cooperation. As 
urban fragmentation is caused due to self-sorting of residents into their preferred 
jurisdictions, localities naturally assume competition with one another. However, 
fragmentation also increases the probability of cooperation by enlarging the pool of 
potential collaborators in the region. 
Post (2002) finds negative effects of regional fragmentation on interlocal 
cooperation. She uses the number of local governments per 10,000 people as a measure 
of fragmentation and the event-count of interlocal monetary transfers to measure 
interlocal cooperation. Such an event-count records number of instances of interlocal 
transfers–revenue as well as expenditure–as a measure of cooperation.  This method of 
measurement does not provide information about the scale of cooperative engagement. A 
single instance of a large sum of monetary transfer between localities might be larger 
than several instances of transfers of smaller amounts. While each instance is counted as 
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one unit of cooperation irrespective of the amount of money involved, the measure does 
not accurately represents the extent of cooperative activities between localities. 
Other studies have also reported a negative impact of fragmentation on interlocal 
cooperation. Olberding (2002b) finds a higher degree of fragmentation and competition 
correlates to a lesser degree of regional cooperation in economic development. Post and 
Stein (2000) find no impact of fragmentation on regional economic interdependence. 
Rawlings (2003) also reports no significant causal relationship between fragmentation 
and metropolitan-area collective action. Likewise, Hawkins (2010), reports lower 
probability of cooperation when metropolitan areas are highly fragmented. Kwon and 
Feiock (2010) also report a negative correlation between fragmentation and interlocal 
cooperation for the delivery of urban services. 
Fragmentation of urban regions also implies that jurisdictional boundaries overlap 
among different general-purpose and special-purpose local governments. Parks and 
Oakerson (1993) find such overlaps to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation. On a 
similar note,  Johnson and  Neiman (2004) report findings from a survey carried out 
among local administrators that localities cooperate in economic development initiatives 
even when majority of them see one another as competitors.  
Krueger (2006), while measuring interlocal cooperation in terms of interlocal 
revenue transfer per capita and fragmentation as number of governments per capita, 
presents an inconclusive finding regarding the relation of fragmentation and interlocal 
cooperation.  
These studies use a variety of methods to operationalize their variables, which 
could be one reason for discrepancy in their findings. Johnson and Neiman use survey 
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data in which respondents are asked if they identify their neighboring localities as 
competitors. Hawkins (2010) uses a per capita measure of fragmentation and a 
dichotomous measure of interlocal cooperation. Kwon and Feiock (2010) also generate a 
binomial measure of interlocal cooperation by asking city administrators whether they 
have considered pursuing joint delivery of urban services with their neighbors.  
Literature presents an indecisive picture regarding the relation between 
metropolitan fragmentation and interlocal cooperation. As identified by many scholars 
(Hawkins, 2010; Krueger, 2006; Post, 2002), fragmentation does seem to work as a 
double-edged sword.  Analysis using large scale aggregated data is needed to find a 
conclusive answer.  
 
Studies on Local Economic Condition and Interlocal Cooperation 
Fragmentation creates localities with discrete preferences, resources, and 
capacities for collective action. Lee and Feiock (2012) shed some light on unequal needs, 
resources, and inequities in power and accountability between localities. They suggest 
that localities that share similar socioeconomic attributes and political institutions are 
more likely to create linkages with each other as they are more likely to share economic 
development agendas and policy preferences. They conducted a survey among select 
residents in the Orlando-Kissimmee metropolitan region to substantiate their theory. 
Economy, economic strength, and economic competitiveness are perhaps the most 
discussed terminologies in regionalism literature. This is the most common and apolitical 
topic of interest for both the reformists and the revisionists. Economic weakness can 
force a locality to seek partners in service delivery and infrastructure development. 
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Elected officials of fiscally weak localities have been reported to advocate for annexation 
bills expecting to improve the economic condition of their governments (Rusk, 1993). 
Others have also identified the fiscal state of localities as a primary impetus for inter-
local cooperation (Downs, 1994;  Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Foster, 1997; Haughwout, 
1999; Heeg et al., 2003; Sonenblum et al., 1977).  
Fiscal capacity of a local government impacts the quality of public services they 
can provide to their citizens and also influences the ability to access capital markets to 
improve infrastructure. A study focused on a five-county region of Southern California 
reported a greater probability of outsourcing municipal services by fiscally stressed 
localities (Joassart-Marcelli & Musso, 2005). Other studies show that cities with a higher 
tax burden per capita are more inclined toward contracting out their public services to 
neighboring governments or private agencies (LeRoux & Carr, 2007; Morgan, Hirlinger, 
& England, 1988). Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) measure local fiscal pressure in terms of 
the percentage of local revenue from federal and state government sources and show a 
positive but feeble correlation with inter-local cooperation. Some other studies, however, 
find local fiscal health to be an insignificant factor in inter-local cooperation decisions 
(Chen & Thurmaier, 2009; Feiock & Park, 2005). The difference in results can be 
attributed to the difference in methodology employed by the researchers.  
Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) use interval-level information that measures 
magnitude of interlocal cooperation, whereas Chen and Thurmaier (2009) use discrete 
measure of instances of cooperative agreements. Chen and Thurmaier’s  (2009) measure 
of fiscal health and its influence on cooperation is based on a survey questionnaire that 
asks city managers if they find it to be a substantial impetus. They do not explain what 
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measures were taken to standardize the responses and control for biases; they use a 
relatively small sample of data, and their coefficient does not attain statistical 
significance. Similarly, Feiock and Park  (2005) use percent of revenues from the 
locality’s own sources to measure fiscal health. While it is a reliable metric, it could have 
generated different results if a scalar measure of interlocal cooperation was used.  
Hawkins (2010) reports that fiscal stress of a locality negatively impacts the 
probability for joint venture. This study uses a binomial dependent variable that reports at 
least one instance of collaboration. He measures fiscal stress as long-term debt per capita. 
This metric has an endogenous relation with the dependent variable. Localities with 
higher debts per capita are not good candidates for a joint venture in economic 
development because they have a bad credit rating and are difficult to trust. Besides, long 
–term debt does not accurately assess a locality’s fiscal capacity as localities experiencing 
high economic growth have better credit scores and have easier access to long-term debts. 
Another weakness of that study is the use of employment in the manufacturing sector to 
measure local economy. In the present state of urban deindustrialization and rise of the 
service economy, it is perhaps not the best measure of economic vitality.   
Even if localities are enjoying good fiscal health, large-scale public goods and/or 
goods characterizing high asset specificity are difficult for small communities to produce. 
When local governments need to invest in specialized equipment and human resources, 
they generally seek a partnership with their neighbors to share costs (Brown & Potoski, 
2003). Fiscally stressed and economically declining localities are not alone in seeking 
partners. Liebman et al. (1963) report localities with thriving economies seeking 
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partnerships with localities having comparable economic conditions. This is an old study 
and needs to be reexamined using current data. 
Metropolitan status, larger population base, higher per capita income, and higher 
job-growth rate are all accepted signs of a healthy economy. Localities with an 
economically sound tax-paying population have an increased financial capacity for 
investing in large infrastructure than their surrounding smaller suburban localities. They 
also have easier access to credit markets. It seems less likely that those localities would 
seek partners for cooperation (Foster, 1997). However, economically sound localities are 
also found to cooperate when there are possibilities of cost reduction and efficiency gains 
through scale economy (Heeg et al., 2003).  
Cities with declining economies—those facing reduction in employment 
opportunities; reduction in income; outmigration of skilled labor; and higher percentage 
of low income and needy residents—can be expected to pursue cooperation in delivery of 
urban services as well as economic growth. A number of scholarly works support this 
hypothesis (Feiock & Park, 2005; Foster, 1997; LeRoux & Carr, 2007; Olberding, 2002a; 
Orfield, 1997b). However, Lubell et al. (2002) found per capita income to be positively 
correlated with the likelihood of cooperation. These variations in findings can be 
attributed to small sample size, methods of measuring variables, and research methods 
used. Feiock and Park (2005), and LeRoux and Carr (2007) examine the relationships 
within a small region using dichotomous dependent variables, whereas Olberding (2002a) 
uses a numerical count of regional partnerships within select metropolitan regions. Both 
methods of measurement fail to reflect the magnitude of cooperation.  A sufficiently large 
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nationwide study using a scalar measure of cooperation will provide a more generalizable 
conclusion. 
Age and the size of the economy are other variables that influence the behavior of 
a locality. Older cities have outdated service infrastructures that require considerable 
investment to modernize. Those cities are more inclined to cooperate either to 
compensate for insufficient in-house production or to expand their service area for more 
revenue. On the contrary, older cities that already have the necessary infrastructure 
required to produce their services in-house are less interested in seeking partners. A 
recent study found that older, highly developed communities with large populations favor 
direct provision of services (LeRoux & Carr, 2007) and that newly incorporated cities 
relied more on outsourcing of services (Joassart-Marcelli & Musso, 2005). On the 
contrary, another study found no difference between decisions to provide services 
externally between industrial and postindustrial cities (Brown & Potoski, 2003). Brown 
and Potoski (2003) also carried out a deeper analysis on the size of the economy where 
they found that large cities within a metropolitan area mostly produce their services in-
house. However, cities outside metropolitan areas are found to seek external sources of 
service production.  On a similar note Joassart-Marcelli & Musso (2005) find smaller 
suburban cities to be more inclined toward outsourcing their urban services.  
 
Studies on Social Characteristics and Interlocal Cooperation 
 Racial mixes and the average age of residents have been theorized to impact local 
intergovernmental relations. Localities are thought to have tendencies to racially 
homogenize. In fact, preference for racial segregation is considered a good reason for the 
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formation of new local governments (Burns, 1994). Communities eager to maintain racial 
hegemony see interlocal cooperation as a threat to their control over local politics. 
Savitch and Vogel (2000) report disinclination of minority African-American population 
groups toward consolidation of Louisville City and Jefferson County. Likewise, Hamilton 
(2004) reports aversion toward regional collective action in Chicago due to the presence 
of incompatible racial pockets. Feiock and Park (2005) also report that racially 
homogenous communities have a higher probability of engaging in cooperation for 
economic development.  
In another study, Hawkins and Feiock (n.d.) report a higher percentage of African 
Americans show preference for interlocal cooperation in the delivery of urban services. 
On the contrary, Lubell et al. (2002) report racial homogeneity measured in terms of the 
percentage of African-American and Hispanic populations to be negatively correlated 
with the probability of local partnerships, while LeRoux and Carr (2007) cite results that 
are inconclusive on the role of race on inter jurisdictional cooperation.  
Based on the literature, it is difficult to conclude if race plays a positive or 
negative role towards cooperation. Hamilton’s (2004) research uses examples such as 
Chicago and Pittsburg that are historically known to have racial issues. LeRoux and 
Carr’s (2007) study is also localized in a handful of counties in Michigan that are known 
to have sharp racial segregation, but the paper stops short of discussing biases due to the 
history of racial incompatibility. Probably economic and fiscal reasons are more 
responsible than racial reasons. Perhaps Norris (2001) and Williams (1967) correctly 
theorized that racially motivated localities cooperate in the issues of service delivery but 
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avoid collaborating in policy issues to maintain their political control. Further research is 
needed to conclusively generalize localities’ behavior on this issue.  
Interlocal cooperation is also affected by the demographic composition of the 
localities. Literature finds mixed influence of the senior population and the population 
approaching retirement on interlocal cooperation. Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) report 
that higher percentage of senior population in localities is correlated with less cooperation 
among localities. They argue that senior people are less open to changes in service 
delivery mechanism. Joassart-Marcelli and Musso (2005) also find that urban services are 
more privatized in cities with lower percentage of elderly population.  LeRoux and Carr 
(2007), however, report that localities with higher percentage of senior population 
cooperate more on joint production of expensive urban utilities. They argue that elderly 
population have higher demand for cheaper public services and they prefer mechanisms 
that promises to lower costs of producing them.    
 
Studies on Geographic Proximity and Interlocal Cooperation 
Geographic proximity with neighbors allows localities to easily reap benefits from 
scale economy. Studies have suggested that when local governments are geographically 
near to one another, they can be expected to collaborate more often for infrastructure and 
services than when they are far apart (Feiock, 2007; Post, 2002). Local governments are 
inclined to cooperate not only in joint production of urban services, but also on common 
regional problems when they are closer. As distances between localities decrease, policy 
externalities easily spill over across boundaries and it is in the best interest of the 
localities to engage in collective action to internalize them (Peirce et al., 1993).  
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Public goods are territorial in nature, and they can only be consumed by users in 
and around the locality where they are produced. At the same time, it is much easier to 
jointly produce and consume local services in collaboration with a contiguous neighbor 
than with a noncontiguous one. Territorially integrated neighbors have been suggested to 
engage in service cooperation more easily than neighbors that are farther away (Heeg et 
al., 2003). Post (2002) uses government density as a measure of proximity and reports 
that the geographic density of localities in the metropolitan regions is significantly and 
positively related to the incidence of local intergovernmental agreements. This study uses 
a sufficiently large sample size but fails to measure the magnitude of interlocal 
cooperation. Minkoff (2012) uses a probabilistic method using a binomial measure of 
interlocal cooperation and finds that geographic proximity positively correlates with 
cooperation among local governments. This study is based on the data collected from 
selected localities in Denver and does not have sufficient sample size needed for 
generalization of findings. 
 
Studies on Geographic Location and Interlocal Cooperation 
Location of a jurisdiction near the city center compared to the suburbs also affects 
their characteristics. Most literature portray sharp racial and economic differences 
between central and suburban localities, and paint a compelling picture of city-suburban 
animosity, which rules out the possibility for cooperation (Hamilton, 2004; Peirce et al., 
1993). However, studies that isolate the effects of location, controlling for other socio-
economic characteristics, have mixed conclusions. Controlling for the effects of 
population size, Brown and Potoski (2003) find that governments located in metropolitan 
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areas have higher probability to joint contracting for service delivery. On the contrary, 
another study found that suburban localities, in general, are more engaged in cooperative 
measures for service production than those in the central city (Joassart-Marcelli & 
Musso, 2005). Theory, however, suggests that proximate localities can reap benefits 
easily irrespective of their sizes. Rawlings (2003), on the other hand, reports no influence 
of central location on cooperative endeavors.   
 
Need for This Study 
 The literature related to local intergovernmental relations paint an encouraging 
picture of scholarly interest in this research area. A number of diverse scholarly articles 
touch on the context of the relationship between local characteristics and local 
cooperation. Some of those studies are focused solely on cooperation for economic 
development; some primarily examine city-suburb relations, and others focus on the role 
of administrative structures. While some scholarly studies examine the influence of 
selected local characteristics on a locality’s ability and preference for cooperation, most 
of them are focused on spotting the existence of cooperative agreements rather than 
measuring the scale and extent of cooperative endeavors.  
A majority of studies use dichotomous measure of interlocal cooperation (Feiock 
& Park, 2005; Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Hawkins & Feiock, n.d; Hawkins, 2010; Johnson 
& Neiman, 2004; Kwon & Feiock, 2010; LeRoux & Carr, 2007; Minkoff, 2012). These 
studies operationalize their dependent variable–measures of interlocal cooperation–in 
terms of the existence of cooperative activity. Respondents are asked if their governments 
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have engaged in any form of cooperation within a time frame. This method of 
measurement does not provide information about the magnitude of cooperative activity.   
Weakness in measurement of the dependent variable is also associated with 
studies that rely on the numerical count of interlocal contracts (Chen & Thurmaier, 2009; 
Krueger, 2006; Lee et al., 2012; Olberding, 2002a;  Post, 2002; Post & Stein, 2000). 
Counting the number of interlocal contracts does not represent the amount of monetary 
transaction. Additionally, interlocal contracts only represent formal cooperation among 
localities while leaving out cooperation through informal handshake deals.  
Other studies that provide compelling explanations about the relationship between 
local characteristics and local cooperation, use very small sample data and are focused on 
specific metropolitan areas. Their findings are intriguing but cannot be generalized. For 
example, Johnson and Neiman (2004) limit their study to medium sized cities in the state 
of California. Lee et al. (2012) focus on the Orlando-Kissimmee metropolitan area. 
Similarly, Foster (1997) focuses on the Buffalo metropolitan region, and Jossart-Marcelli 
and Musso (2005) limit their scope to a five-county Southern California region. Chen and 
Thurmaier’s (2009) study is also limited to local governments in the state of Iowa. 
Minkoff (2012) uses select cities in Colorado, while Hamilton (2004) focuses on Chicago 
and Pittsburgh. This piecemeal approach to the study of local cooperation is probably 
another reason for variations in their findings. Aggregate studies like the one by Krueger 
(2006) is not directly focused on interlocal cooperation, and another by Ferris and Graddy 
(1986) lacks currency. There is a need for a comprehensive and generalizable study that 
can provide conclusive answers about the influence of local characteristics on interlocal 
cooperation using aggregate data and a dependent variable that measures not only the 
41 
 
instances of cooperation but also the magnitude. The following chapters demonstrate how 










RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESES, AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Question 
Urban literature generally agrees that most prevailing urban problems are caused 
by cost spillovers resulting from fragmentation and self-governance. Previous chapters 
have shed light on the concept of governance without government as the most appropriate 
model to resolve longstanding and pressing urban issues without imposing much 
restriction on public choice and jurisdictional autonomy. Parks and Oakerson (1989) 
introduced the idea of “local public economies” that explained how multiple overlapping, 
and cross-cutting jurisdictions might organize themselves to reap benefits of scale 
economy in service production as well as to resolve cross-border problems. Transaction-
cost theory provides a generic foundation for the understanding of any type of 
cooperation among individuals and institutions. The literature suggests that localities both 
in cities and suburbs need to work together to solve mutual problems, and it also tells 
how obstacles to institutional collective action can be overcome through communication, 
interaction, and joint ventures. Cities are competing and cooperating with their neighbors 
at all times in various policy areas; and some localities cooperate more than others. The 
most logical reason for the difference in level of cooperation among localities could be 
that localities are characteristically different to begin with. Some localities are rich while 
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others are poor, some have a higher capacity for service provision; some have numerous 
internal problems and a high degree of fiscal stress; some have specific cultural 
reputation; some have better resources; and some are more globally connected than 
others. Also some are centers of commerce; some are manufacturing hubs while others 
are bedroom communities. The literature does not provide a sufficient explanation for 
how local characteristics influence the cooperative decisions of localities. This 
manuscript strives to answer one question: Which local characteristics encourage 
interlocal cooperation? The following section elaborates further on research questions 
and constructs the hypotheses for this study. 
 
Specific Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This manuscript seeks to answer the following questions:  
Q1: Does metropolitan fragmentation increase or decrease interlocal cooperation? 
Q2: How does the variation in economic capacity between localities affect 
interlocal cooperation? 
Q3: How do the variations in social class, demographics, and race influence 
interlocal cooperation? 
Three research hypotheses are proposed to answer these questions.  
H1: Localities in politically fragmented metropolitan regions and those in close 
proximity to one another engage more in interlocal cooperation. 
H2: Economic distress pushes localities to seek partners for cooperation. 
H3: Homogenous racial and economic classes favor interlocal cooperation.  
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The first hypothesis of this study focuses on urban fragmentation. Fragmentation 
is the proliferation of local governments within urban regions. Miller et. al. (1995) 
measures metropolitan fragmentation as the number of local governments—cities, 
municipalities, townships, and special districts—per unit population. The presence of 
more governments per capita simply signifies more preferential sorting within a region. 
This also suggests an increase in the number of government units competing for limited 
resources. Teibout (1956) suggests that localities within a fragmented region can only be 
expected to compete with one another in order to provide attractive tax-services bundles 
to targeted population. Peterson’s (1981) city-limits hypothesis also points toward a 
competitive scenario between local governments with no room for cooperation.  On the 
other hand, Parks and Oakerson (1993) believe that fragmented localities can easily 
engage in regionally integrative production structures. Feiock et al. (2004) suggest that 
competition and cooperation can coexist. Hawkins and Feiock (n.d.) also claim that cities 
have been found to cooperate even when competition is the generally accepted norm. The 
argument that cities and suburbs are economically interlinked and their individual 
prosperity is tied to the regional prosperity (Savitch et al., 1993) also suggests that 
localities might cooperate for mutual benefits.  
Olson’s (1971) theory on group sizes says that the more group size increases, the 
more difficult it is to get individuals to cooperate because of the increase in the 
transaction cost of enforcement and monitoring mutual agreements. This manuscript 
argues that this logic does not apply to urban localities. Urban localities have fixed 
geographies, and irrespective to the number of localities in the region, an individual 
locality always has a fixed number of neighbors. In selected policy arenas such as the 
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maintenance of air and water quality many non neighboring localities collaborate on 
regional issues, but the geographically fixed nature of urban infrastructure and the effects 
of local policies suggest that localities are concerned more about interacting with their 
immediate neighbors. Therefore increased group size might not impact interlocal 
cooperation in the way assumed by Olson’s theory. Rather, increased fragmentation 
enables localities to capitalize on service provision capacities of their neighbors and 
increases the potential for sharing as well as and minimizing risks. In consonance with 
the theory suggested by Parks and Oakerson (1993), it is hypothesized that increasing 
metropolitan fragmentation increases the possibility of interlocal cooperation.  
Urban literature also suggests that fragmentation produces centrifugal forces, 
creating new localities outside the city–generally in suburban areas, and sometimes even 
further away in adjoining rural areas also known as exurban cities. Proximate neighbors 
might share more across boundaries than others that are geographically separated. When 
localities are too close to each other, service-production collaboration is easy to 
materialize. In such a scenario, the policy effects are also difficult to contain within 
jurisdictional boundaries. A shared local economy can easily blur jurisdictional lines and 
create demand for complementary land uses. Proximate localities can easily realize 
economies of scale by cooperating with their neighbors. Therefore, localities that are in 
close proximity with their neighbors are expected to engage more in interlocal 
cooperation.  
The second hypothesis focuses on the effect of a local economy on interlocal 
cooperation. Transaction-cost theory suggests that localities cooperate when it is less 
expensive for them to engage in joint production (or provision) of urban services. 
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Localities either count on economic benefits or have an economic need to engage in 
cooperation. Economic benefit is realized when it is cheaper to produce services jointly. 
Economic need arises when a locality is not able to continue to produce or provide 
certain services and is forced to seek partners for service continuity.  
The local economy can be viewed in two different ways: (1) by the economic 
vitality of the locality in general, which is traditionally measured in terms of the wealth of 
the residents, opportunities for employment, and the existence of a thriving commercial 
sector; and (2) by the fiscal capacity of the governing institution, typically measured in 
terms of revenue collected from local sources, the ability to maintain existing 
infrastructure and develop new ones, and the capacity to pay off debts. Generally these 
two aspects of a local economy are complementary. Wealthier residents, higher property 
values, commercial, retail, and entertainment activities generate revenue for the 
governing institution. As a result, the governing body has higher credit worthiness and 
more accessibility to capital markets. It can then invest in more services, levy fewer 
taxes, and further enhance the attractiveness of the area.  
Economically thriving communities with better employment opportunities, higher 
wages, and better living conditions can attract migrants from surrounding areas. By 
employing zoning regulations and assigning land uses, localities can generally prevent 
unwanted low-skilled, working-class residents from moving in permanently. They adopt 
zoning regulations that favor high-end services and infrastructure to attract wealthy 
residents from the surrounding area. Such in-migration puts pressure on infrastructure 
and even though these localities have the capacity to invest in developmental activities, 
they are not able to do it quickly enough to be commensurate with the rate of growth.  
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Developmental activities require large investments, and localities seek ways to 
minimize risks. One way to meet the increasing service demand and lower risk on 
investment is to engage in partnership with neighboring localities. Localities can be 
expected to engage in cooperation with neighbors that have a strong and stable economy. 
Poorer neighbors generally have lower investment capacities and bad credit ratings. Any 
joint venture with such localities would be a risky endeavor.  
In contrast, economically distressed localities might find it much easier and more 
effective to provide urban services to their residents by using cooperative means of 
production. Poor localities  cannot collect much revenue from property taxes as property 
values are lower in their jurisdictions. Lower property values attract more poor people 
from surrounding areas (most of them probably employed as unskilled labor in nearby 
thriving localities). With a higher tax burden, lower tax capacity, and high demand for 
urban services due to the influx of working-class people, such localities face tremendous 
fiscal pressures. Probably they can ensure service continuity to their residents only by 
cooperating or collaborating with neighboring localities.  
The third hypothesis of this research focuses on the influence of racial and 
economic classes on interlocal cooperation. Preferential sorting based on the social 
characteristics of residents is another outcome of fragmentation. People also make 
decisions about their residential location based on factors such as income levels and 
racial identity. People prefer to live in localities where they are in the majority. Burns 
(1994) claims that preference for racial segregation is the major reason for the formation 
of new local governments. Similarly, Savitch and Vogel (2000) found that minority 
groups were against the consolidation of Louisville city with Jefferson County due to the 
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fear of political dilution. Race and class are strongly correlated in most American 
metropolitan areas. The extant literature on fragmentation and segregation suggests that 
the white majority tends to segregate from blacks by migrating into the suburbs. As 
suggested by the findings of Savitch and Vogel (2000) minority blacks also seek to 
segregate from whites. While considering race as an independent factor, localities with 
contrasting racial majorities are not expected to cooperate with each other. However, 
racial segregation often implies economic segregation as well. In most localities, racial 
minorities are also found to be poor, pay fewer taxes, and demand more services than 
what they pay for (Downs, 1994; Ledebur & Barnes, 1992). These localities are generally 
fiscally stressed and are better off cooperating with their neighbors irrespective of racial 
attitudes.  
Racial homogeneity has different meanings at different geographic scales. Higher 
racial homogeneity of a metropolitan region implies that the localities within the region 
are more likely to have similar racial makeup. In that case cooperation is comparatively 
easy to achieve. Hence racially homogenous metropolitan regions are expected to 
experience more aggregate interlocal cooperation. 
Racial homogeneity of a locality represents its internal racial structure. Its 
attitudes towards interlocal cooperation depend on the racial characteristics of its 
neighbors. If the neighboring localities are also internally homogenous with a similar 
racial majority, cooperation is easier between those localities. Conversely, two differently 
homogenous neighboring localities might have difficulty cooperating because of racial 
biases and distrust. The very fact that segregation is the result of the white flight, and the 
African-Americans’ preference for a racial clout suggests that either racial majority at the 
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local level does not approve of interlocal cooperation. Therefore localities with 
contrasting racial majorities are not expected to engage in interlocal cooperation with one 
another.  
Seniors, retired, and a population nearing retirement comprise the demographic 
segment that can be expected to have a contrasting attitude toward interlocal cooperation 
compared to its occupationally active counterparts. These people often have less 
disposable income and more per capita demand for urban services. They generally have 
no other ideological biases except that they prefer to reside in inexpensive localities with 
inexpensive services. Public service is more of a necessity than lifestyle preference for 
this population group. They can be expected to vote for any service provision mechanism 
that ensures availability and affordability of urban services for a long time.  
The income class of the population is another variable explored in this 
manuscript. Regions with higher levels of economic inequality can be expected to 
experience lower levels of interlocal cooperation. Regional inequality implies that 
residents of the localities in the region have sharp differences in income levels. Poor 
communities might be better off cooperating with their wealthier neighbors, but wealthier 
areas have less incentive to do the same. Cooperation cannot be expected in such an 
environment that lacks reciprocity. Conversely, in regions with low income inequality, all 
neighboring localities have similar economic characteristics, and therefore  similar 
preferences for urban services. Economically homogenous regions can thus be expected 





This study uses a multivariate quantitative method to examine the hypothesized 
relationships. Descriptive statistics are used to show the magnitude of interlocal 
cooperation and the extent of various local characteristics. Preliminary relationships are 
studied using correlation matrices, followed by multivariate regression to identify the 
direction and magnitude of the effects of various local characteristics on interlocal 
cooperation. The dependent and independent variables, and the control parameters used 
in this analysis are described in succeeding sections. 
 
Units of Analysis 
 Local government, including counties, cities, and townships within the 
metropolitan region, is the unit of analysis for this study. The Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) defines metropolitan statistical areas as having at least one urbanized 
area of 50,000 or more population, and adjacent territory that has a high degree of social 
and economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties. In this sense, a 
metropolitan statistical area is the closest approximation of an economically linked urban 
region. Whereas metropolitan areas represent the extent of an urban economic region, 
localities are the building blocks of that region. Although special-purpose governments 
such as special districts and public authorities also are functionally specific and cross-
cutting jurisdictions, this manuscript only uses general-purpose local governments for the 
analysis. The rationale to limit the analysis only to general-purpose governments is first 
that these units sufficiently represent an urban voting population and, second, they have 
unique and non overlapping boundaries that make data comparison easier. This study 
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uses relevant information of localities in 51 of the largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSA) in the country, selected on the basis of population size of one million or more per 
the 2010 census count. Component counties for those metropolitan areas, and all sub 
county-level local governments—cities, municipalities, and townships—are identified per 
census designation and use the integrated government directory of the census of 
governments. Selected socioeconomic, political, and geographic characteristics for 
individual localities are gleaned from the census summary files and the American 
community survey 5-year estimates. Quantitative analysis is carried out at both MSA as 
well as local levels. Area-wide characteristics such as fragmentation and income 
inequalities are appropriately measured across localities at the MSA levels, whereas 
economic and social variations are measured at both local and regional scale for the 
purpose of comparison. 
     
Variables and Measures 
Interlocal Cooperation (Dependent Variable) 
 Interlocal cooperation refers to any form of cooperative activities between 
county, city or municipality, and township governments. According to the census bureau 
the term municipal government refers to political subdivisions within which a municipal 
corporation has been established to provide general local government for a specific 
population concentration in a defined area, and includes all active government units 
officially designated as cities, boroughs (except in Alaska), towns (except in six New 
England States, and in Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin), and villages
2
. Township 
governments are mostly prevalent in the six New England states, New York, and 
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Wisconsin. However, most of them are legally termed as municipal corporations. In 
Minnesota the terms town and township are used interchangeably.  
When cities, counties, municipalities, and towns engage in any form of service 
contracts, tax-sharing covenants, joint construction and upkeep of some infrastructure, 
there generally involves an exchange of funds unless they are handshake deals as pointed 
out by Post (2002). Interlocal cooperation is measured by using interlocal revenue 
transfers between selected types of local governments. Interlocal revenue information for 
the year 2010 has been obtained from the Census of Governments.  
Local governments exchange funds among themselves for cooperative activities 
in a variety of budget categories including highways, housing and community 
development, health and hospitals, public welfare, sewerage, water, gas, electric, transit 
utilities, and some miscellaneous categories. Though the listed categories suggest that 
localities cooperate on system maintenance as well as some lifestyle services, this 
manuscript does not disaggregate the information to simplify the analysis.  
Monetary transfers among local governments provide a scalar measure of 
interlocal cooperation. The magnitude of interlocal monetary transfer is the measure of 
the extent of interlocal cooperation between localities. This overcomes the limitations of 
dichotomous variables, which simply measure the presence or the absence of interlocal 
cooperation. It also overcomes the weakness in measuring the extent of cooperation by 
counting the instances of interlocal agreements. The number of interlocal agreements 
does not represent the magnitude of cooperative activities. Besides, interlocal contracts 
only represent those cooperative activities that are formally recorded. They do not 
measure the extent of cooperation that occurs through informal or handshake deals.  
53 
 
This analysis specifically uses interlocal revenue transfer (ilrev) between local 
governments to operationalize the dependent variable rather than interlocal expenditure 
as used by some other authors (S. Post, 2002; Rawlings, 2003) because the information 
on interlocal expenditure does not distinguish between a fund that is transferred to 
another general-purpose local government or to a special-purpose government. Special-
purpose governments provide functionally specific services across localities. It is very 
rare that they receive services from general-purpose governments that necessitate any 
payments that would be reflected in interlocal revenue books of the localities. Interlocal 
revenue primarily represents cooperative activities taking place among general-purpose 
local governments only, which is the central focus of this study.  
 
Independent Variables 
Metropolitan fragmentation, economic distress, socio-demographic variation, and 
geographic proximity are the independent variables used in this study. These variables 
are measured both at the local-government level and the metropolitan level and are used 
in quantitative models representing respective geographic scale.  
Fragmentation of metropolitan areas is represented by a proliferation of political 
jurisdictions in the regions. Many scholars have used various methods to measure 
fragmentation. One of the simplest methods is to count the number of local governments 
per capita in the region (Dolan, 1990). Bollens (1986) uses the number of governments 
per 100,000 people as a measure of fragmentation. Similarly, Hawkins (1971) uses the 
number of governments per 100,000 people as a fragmentation index. Parks and 
Oakerson (1992) use the number of governments per 10,000 as a fragmentation score. In 
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an effort to measure the contribution of each government to the region in addition to the 
regional fragmentation, Mitchell-Weaver et al.(2000) has developed the Metropolitan 
Fragmentation Index (MFI). Similarly, Miller (2002) uses the Metropolitan Power 
Diffusion Index (MPDI) that measures fragmentation as well as the division of authority 
among small and large jurisdictions. For simplicity, this study uses the number of local 
governments (excluding school districts) per 100,000 people as the fragmentation index 
(frag) of metropolitan regions as is used by Hawkins (1971), Parks and Oakerson (1992), 
and Post & Stein (2000).  
Reviewing the theories of metropolitan fragmentation, it is usually a result of 
“voting with the feet,” i.e. residents from one jurisdiction (usually central cities) migrate 
to suburban areas thereby creating new localities on the periphery of the city (Tiebout, 
1956). Distance between localities within the metropolitan region has been measured in 
terms of the density of local governments. This study uses distance between localities in 
terms of number of jurisdictions per 100 square miles
3
 as a measure of proximity 
(govdensity). As the density of governments increases, the number of localities per unit 
area also increases, thus decreasing the geographic distances between them.  
A measure of central location has been used to compare interlocal cooperation 
among localities in the central city  and those in the suburban areas. The variable is a 
dummy that is coded 1 for jurisdictions located in central city and 0 if located in an 
outlying area. 
The economy variable is operationalized using the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of metropolitan areas, per capita income, median household income, and property 
values. At the regional scale, Gross Domestic Product of metropolitan area (GMP) 
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measures its economic vitality. Conventional measures of economy such as per capita 
income and employment have also been used in the analysis. Employment information 
has been regrouped into four categories: employment in the growth sector (empgrowth), 
technology sector (emptech), manufacturing sector (empmanu), and the service sector 
(empserv). Employment in the growth sector includes employment in retail trade, 
finance, insurance, and real estate. Employment in the technology sector includes 
employment in the information sector, and professional and scientific sectors. 
Employment in the manufacturing sector includes all employment in the manufacturing 
sector, with warehousing and transportation associated with it. Employment in the service 
sector includes employment in public administration, health and educational services, and 
“other” services as designated by the census. Identifying localities by dominant industries 
provide the opportunity to determine which localities follow more traditional methods of 
growth and which economies are more adaptive to changes in the industry.   
Education is another variable that represents the economic vitality of a locality. 
An educated workforce reflects the availability of high-skill employment. Employment 
categories as previously explained do not make a distinction between skilled and 
unskilled employment. Employment that requires skilled workforce has higher pay scale, 
which increases the disposable income of the residents in a locality. Unskilled jobs 
employ a large number of people, but the per capita pay is generally lower. An educated 
workforce can be expected to better understand the benefits of joint endeavors between 
localities and can be expected to vote in favor of them. A percentage of the population 
with graduate degrees has been used as a metric for education. 
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Institutional economic strength of a locality is its ability to generate revenue 
through local resources. Since property taxes make up a major portion of local revenue, 
median home value (homeval) has been used to asses this capacity. Higher property 
values reflect stronger fiscal state of the local government whereas lower property values 
represent distress of localities. From the consumers’ point of view, higher property values 
also measure the demand for premium urban services.  
Another measure of the economic distress of a locality is Fiscal Stress (fstress) 
experienced by the governing institution. Localities with high tax-burden and low tax-
yield have been considered stressed fiscally (Miller et al., 1995). This reflects lower 
revenues and higher expenditures. Those localities end up borrowing from the market (as 
long as they maintain acceptable credit scores) or from state and federal governments to 
compensate for the differential. A ratio with the total expenditure of the locality as the 
numerator and its total revenue as the denominator has been used to measure fiscal stress. 
Such a ratio has been suggested as a metric of fiscal stress of local governments in the 
CBO Economic and Budget Issue Brief (Delisle, 2010). When the expenditure is less 
than the revenue, the ratio assumes a value less than one. This suggests that localities 
have been able to generate sufficient revenue to cover their costs. The numerical value of 
fiscal stress of more than one signifies that expenditures exceed revenue. This is the 
situation when localities either have to start reducing their expenditures by downsizing or 
shutting down some services or pursue external financial support such as state and federal 
governments, to meet their expenditures. In either condition, those localities are 
considered to be in a state of fiscal distress. 
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Sociodemographic variables include racial homogeneity, senior population, 
income classes, and the measure of income inequality. Conventionally, racial makeup is 
measured using a percentage of the black population. Since whites are considered to be 
the majority group, an increase in the black or African-American population signifies a 
more heterogeneous locality in conventional terms. In addition to the conventional 
measures of race, this study uses homogeneity to measure racial makeup of the locality. 
Homogeneity has been calculated as the absolute differences between percentages of the 
whites and the blacks in the community. Homogeneity scale ranges from 0 to 100. A 
value of 100 means that the locality has people of only one of the two races, and a score 
of 0 signifies the presence of equal numbers of residents of the two races 
Age of the population is another variable used in the study. Assuming that 
people’s preferences are dependent on their ability to earn money and desire for a certain 
lifestyle, this study focuses on the difference between a younger, economically active 
demographic and a retired senior demographic. Age is measured in terms of the 
percentage of the population 65 years and older (seniorpop) in the locality.  
Other social variables used in the analysis are income class and income 
inequality. The U.S. Census Bureau determines poverty using a threshold
4
 of the number 
of family members and their combined incomes compared to the consumer price index. 
However, this poverty threshold does not vary with geography. This study categorizes 
income classes (class) in terms of their dispersion from the median household income. 
Percentage of households earning less than 50 percent of the median household income 
of the locality is categorized as poor, whereas those earning more than 150 percent of the 
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median income are grouped as rich. All households between those two categories are 
considered middle class (mclass).   
Wealth differences between populations across localities have been measured 
using the Gini coefficient
5
of income inequality. Gini coefficients have been calculated for 
each metropolitan region using the information on household-income groups published in 
the American Community Survey. Gini calculated for the MSAs represents income 
inequality within the metropolitan regions, which also represents inequality between 
localities since localities are the building blocks of MSAs. It makes more sense to 
measure differences between localities in the metropolitan region than to measure 
inequality within the locality because the fragmentation theory suggests that localities are 
internally homogenous. The value of the Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where 
values close to 0 imply perfect equality, and those close to 1 suggest perfect inequality.  
Four control variables are used in the analysis. They are age of the economy, type 
of the government, census designated regions, and population size. Age of the economy 
(agecity/agemsa) can influence levels of interlocal cooperation. Older localities generally 
tend to have higher levels of public-service infrastructure that they can leverage with 
nearby localities to achieve economies of scale. At the same time older localities also 
tend to have outdated infrastructure that is overconsumed and in need of costly repair. 
These localities might simply seek cooperation with their neighbors to keep maintenance 
costs down irrespective of their economic state. Age of the economy is measured as 
median age of the home built in the locality, similar to the one used by Ijla, Ryberg, 
Rosentraub, & Bowen (2011)   
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Type of government (govtype) is another control variable used in the analysis. 
This variable is expected to measure the difference in voters’ preference for cooperation 
if they are a county government (county), a city government (city), or a township (town). 
Similarly, dummy variables for census-designated regions– northeast (ne), Midwest 
(mw), the south (s), and the west (w) are used to control for regional variations to 
generalize the findings. A list of all research variables, their measures, and their sources 
are presented in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1  
List of Research Variables 
Variables Measures / Sources 
Dependent Variable  
Inter-Local 
Cooperation (ilrev) 
Aggregate of revenue transfers between local governments  as presented in 
2010 estimates of the Census of Governments, State and Local Government 
Finances 
Independent Variables  
Fragmentation Index 
(frag) 
Number of local governments per 100,000 people. List of county 
governments within metropolitan areas obtained from 2010 metropolitan 
component counties of the census bureau.  Local governments within each 
metropolitan area obtained from the Government Integrated Directory of the 
Census of Governments. 




 Central or outlying, census bureau, SMSA and CBSA delineation files 
GDP GDP of metropolitan area for 2010 (in thousands of dollars) published by 
the Bureau of Economic Affairs 
income Per capita income: Selected Economic Characteristics, ACS 2010 , DP03 
empgrowth Employment by industry: ACS 2010, construction + retail trade+ wholesale 
trade + FIRE 
emptech Employment by industry: ACS 2010, information sector + professional and 
scientific sector 
empmanu Employment by industry: ACS 2010, manufacturing sector + warehouse + 
transportation sectors 
empserv Employment by industry: ACS 2010, education and health + other services 
+ public administration 
graduate Percentage of population with graduate education, 2010 ACS, selected 
social characteristics, DP02 
homeval Median home value – 2010 ACS, GCT2510 
fstress Fiscal stress: ratio of total expenditure to total  revenue. 2010 Census of 
Governments, state and local government finances 
Race (black) Percentage of population designated as “Black or African-American”, 2010 
SF-1, P3 
homogeneity Absolute difference between percentage of Whites and Blacks in a locality 
seniorpop Percentage of Population 65 years and older, 2010 SF-1, QT-P2 
poor Families with HH income less than 50 percentof median HH income of the 
MSA 
mclass Families with HH income 50 percent to 150 percent of median HH income 
of the MSA 
rich Families with HH income more than 150  percent of median HH income  
gini Gini coefficient calculated from household income available in 2010 ACS, 
Selected Economic Characteristics, DP03 
Control Variables  
Size (pop) Total population as obtained from  Census Summary Files SF-1, P1 
agecity / agemsa Median-year structure built, 2010 ACS, B25035 
Type: city, county, 
township 
Coded 1 for true and  0 for false. 2010 State and Local Government 
Finances 
Regional Variation  ne, 
mw, s, w 




The data uses variables that have different spreads. Many of the variables also 
display considerable right skewedness. To standardize the spread of the data and to 
correct the skewedness in distribution, those variables have been transformed by taking 
their logarithms with base 10. A log transformation does not change the relationship 
between the variables but only makes the interpretation easier by minimizing skewedness 
and standardizing the spread of the data. Log transformation can only be used in the case 
of continuous variables. Logit transformation has been applied to the variables 
representing a fraction or ratio. The transformations work as shown in the following 
schemes: 
Log transformation with base 10:  n ---- > log10 (n) 
Logit transformation using log10 function:  p ----- > log10 [ p / (1 - p) ] 
A list of variables transformed using logarithmic and logit methods are presented in 
Table 3.2. Other transformations used in the analysis are per capita conversions and 
percentages. Both transformations help to minimize spurious effects of population size on 
other variables. Conversion to per capita figures has been done using the population 
variable as the denominator. Percentage conversion transforms the spread of the data to a 




































































































































































































































































































































This study uses Robust Linear Regression
7
 to identify causal relations between 
selected local characteristics and interlocal cooperation. Because the analysis uses 
information for three types of very differently sized localities – counties, cities, and 
towns, a great deal of variation in the data for different types of governments can be 
expected. Extreme numbers in this data are not outliers; they are good pieces of 
information. However, they also can bias causal models if they are weighed equally. 
Robust method minimizes the effects of extreme outliers while still keeping them in the 
analysis. An example of a generalized model employed in this study is as follows: 
Interlocal Cooperation ~ (fragmentation and proximity) + (economic 
characteristics) + (social characteristics) + (control variables)  
This analysis seeks to build a parsimonious model including all research 
variables. In cases where variables show collinearity problems and were still required in 
the model to evaluate the hypothesis, new models have been created to study the impacts 
of collinear pairs separately.  
This study also uses statistical diagnosis to test the suitability of regression 
models. It uses Pearson’s bivariate correlations to identify unusual relationships between 
pairs of research variables. Possible multicollinearity problems are identified at this stage. 
Goodness of fit statistics (e.g. r-squared, adjusted r-squared, and model p-value) is 
reported for each model. T-statistics and p-values for coefficients are also calculated. 
Finally, model residuals are plotted against theoretical quantiles in a Q-Q plot to verify 
that residuals are normally distributed. A scatterplot of residuals and fitted values is also 







DATA PORTRAYAL AND ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter provides the description of the data including the averages, 
dispersion, and range for each research variable. It is followed by a section examining the 
bivariate correlations between variables, which gives a preliminary idea about the 
hypothesized relations between research variables and also provides valuable information 
about levels of collinearity that exist between some of them. The chapter concludes with 
findings from the regression analysis. Finally, a tabular summary of results with special 
reference to the research hypotheses concludes the chapter. 
 
Summary of the Data 
This study uses two datasets–one with variables aggregated for Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) and another with variables measured at the local level. The first 
dataset includes 51 of the largest metropolitan areas in the U.S.A. per the 2010-census 
population data. The second dataset has information about 1165 localities contained 
within those 51 MSAs. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarize the variables aggregated for 
selected MSAs. Similarly, Tables 4.3 and 4.4 respectively present the frequency 









Frequency Distribution of Binomial Variables at MSA Level 
Variables Frequency Percent 
MSAs in Northeast Region (NE) 8 15.7 
MSAs in Midwest Region (MW) 10 19.6 
MSAs in the South (S) 21 41.2 
MSAs in the West (W) 12 23.5 









Table 4.2  
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Measured at MSA Level 
Variables Min. Max. Average Std. Dev. 
Interlocal Revenue ($,000) 5618 1162560 207441.8 258638.1 
Interlocal Revenue Per Capita ($) 4.63 321.91 65.73 60.02 
Fragmentation Index 1.08 32.89 10.87 8.52 
Local Governments  21 1356 295.8 279.23 
Density of Governments 0.27 18.84 6.27 4.61 
Total Population 1054323 18897109 3276223.82 3177753.58 
Gross Metropolitan Product ($,000) 44607 1280307 183129.6 207233.4 
Median Household Income ($) 46260 86290 56990 8788.59 
Growth-Sector Employment (%) 23.11 34.83 29.56 2.60 
Technology-Sector Employment (%) 10.56 23.97 14.34 2.75 
Manufacturing-Sector Employment (%) 6.93 22.48 15.29 3.58 
Service-Sector Employment (%) 21.51 38.8 30.82 3.44 
Unemployed (%) 5.8 12.7 7.82 1.29 
Population with Graduate Degree (%) 6.7 22.2 11.5 2.94 
Median Home Value ($) 113900 696200 245298.03 131858.18 
Black or African-American (%) 1.51 45.67 15.23 9.47 
White (%) 47.46 87.82 69.65 10.06 
Homogeneity 2.25 80.48 54.42 16.67 
Senior Population (%) 8.08 17.28 11.95 2.08 
Poor (%) 14.7 26.69 20.9 3.11 
Middle Class (%) 13.87 40.24 30.08 4.83 
Rich (%) 36.65 62.43 49.01 6.75 
Gini Coefficient  0.36 0.52 0.42 0.031 
Age of the MSA (years) 16 57 35.6 10.4 







Table 4.3  
Frequency Distribution of Binomial Variables at Local Level 
Variables Frequency Percent 
Central Localities 1015 87.1 
Outlying Localities 150 12.9 
City 757 65.0 
County 204 17.5 
Township 204 17.5 
NE 304 26.1 
MW 430 36.9 
S 270 23.2 
W 161 13.8 








Table 4.4  
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Measured at Local level 
Variables Min. Max. Average Std. Dev. 
Interlocal Revenue ($,000) 1 88226 4092.64 10177.93 
Interlocal Revenue per capita ($) 0.02 13853.88 78.31 439.47 
Total Revenue ($000) 491 5102000 200400 501688.6 
I-L Revenue as Percent of Total .001 63.42 4.07 7.37 
I-L Revenue as Percent (City) .001 63.42 4.54 8.07 
I-L Revenue as Percent (Town) .001 34.74 3.85 6.44 
I-L Revenue as Percent (County) .004 30.4 2.35 4.06 
Total Population 219 1714773 113652.39 222865.82 
Per Capita Income ($) 11161 115334 32000.72 12216.65 
Growth-Sector  Employment (%) 11.75 63.31 29.62 4.12 
Technology-Sector Employment (%) 1.2 39.8 14.04 4.72 
Manufacturing-Sector Employment (%) 2.4 42.73 16.7 5.67 
Service-Sector Employment (%) 12.98 55.57 30.5 5.24 
Unemployed (%) 1.00 24.80 7.27 2.87 
Fiscal Stress  0.108 9.79 1.00 0.326 
Population with Graduate Degree (%) 0 48.69 12.47 8.34 
Median Home Value ($) 33600 1000000 271865.55 158245.73 
Black or African-American (%) 0.17 93.97 11.01 15.48 
White (%) 1.96 100 76.61 18.89 
Homogeneity 0.01 98.73 69.0 24.48 
Senior Population (%) 0.47 96.43 12.99 5.43 
Poor (%) 1.76 66.6 25.3 11.4 
Middle Class (%) 4.56 65.05 34.77 8.18 
Rich (%) 6.62 90.1 39.94 15.23 
Age of the Locality (years) 7.00 71.00 36.84 14.80 





As shown in Table 4.1, about 41 percent of the MSAs selected for this study are 
in the South, approximately 20 percent of them are in the West and the Midwest each, 
and about 16 percent are in the Northeast.  
The extent of interlocal cooperation represented by the aggregated interlocal-
revenue transfers among localities measured at the MSA level ranges from about $4.63 to 
$322 per person. On average, local governments in metropolitan areas generate about $65 
per person in interlocal revenue.  Measured at the local government level, interlocal 
revenue per capita averages about $78 per person. Similarly, interlocal-revenue transfers 
between selected localities range from two cents to almost $13,900 per capita, with actual 
monetary amounts ranging from $1,000 to around $88 million. The standard deviation is 
about $10 million or $440 per capita. The data range, averages, and dispersion tell us that 
interlocal revenue is skewed to the right of the distribution. This suggests there are fewer 
localities with very high interlocal revenues compared to a large number with low to 
moderate revenue transfers. Additionally, city governments have slightly higher average 
interlocal revenue than townships and county governments. The average per capita 
interlocal revenue of city governments is $4.54 compared to $3.85 of townships and 
$2.35 of county governments.  Table 4.5 lists some of the localities and MSAs with the 







MSAs and Localities with Highest and Lowest Interlocal Revenue Transfers Per Capita 
Highest Lowest 
MSA Locality MSA Locality 
Memphis, TN Industry City, CA Hartford, CT Piscataway Township, NJ 
Rochester, NY Fenton City, MO Boston, MA Jefferson County, WV 
Buffalo, NY Falls Church City, VA Oklahoma City, OK Gloucester Township, NJ 
Las Vegas, NV Des Peres City, MO Pittsburgh, PA Valparaiso Town, IN 
Washington, DC Mathews County, VA Providence, RI Shoreview City, MN 
    
Average fragmentation index in the MSAs is about 11 local governments per 
100,000 people. The range varies from approximately two governments to 33 
government units for every 100,000 people. Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Denver, Kansas City 
(Mo.–Kan.), and Memphis (Tenn.–Miss.–Ark.) are the five most fragmented 
metropolitan regions in this dataset. Similarly, Las Vegas, Baltimore, Houston, Los 
Angeles, and Washington D.C. are the five least fragmented regions. The number of local 
governments including cities, counties, municipalities, townships, villages, and special 
districts range from 21 to 1,356 with an average of 295.8. Chicago, New York, St. Louis, 
Denver, and Pittsburgh have the most local governments by count. Urban regions with 
the least number of local governments are Las Vegas, New Orleans, Virginia Beach 
(Va.), Baltimore, and Raleigh (N.C.). Similarly, the range of density information reveals 
that localities are condensed to about19 units within 10 square miles, to less than one unit 
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within that geography. The average density of governments is about six units per 100 
square miles.  
Of the 1,164 localities selected, 204 (17.5 percent) are county governments, 756 
(65 percent) are city or municipality governments, and the remaining 204 (17.5 percent) 
are township governments. Of all the townships used in this study, 84 percent (172) are in 
the Northeast, and the remaining 32 are in the Midwest. Similarly, of 756 cities and 
municipalities, 101 (13 percent) are in the Northeast, 345 (45 percent) are in the Midwest, 
173 (29 percent) from the South, and 137 (18 percent) are from the West. Of the selected 
localities 87 percent are located fully or partially in a central county.  
Data related to the size of the localities has shown to be right-skewed as well. The 
smallest local government in the dataset has 219 people, and the largest has about 1.8 
million people, with an average of around 113,000 and a standard deviation of 222,000 
people.  
Localities selected for this study also vary considerably in terms of their economic 
characteristics. With a minimum of $44 million and a maximum of $1.2 billion, the 
average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the metropolitan areas selected for this study 
is $183 million, a metric that also seems to be right skewed. Another metric of economic 
vitality at the metropolitan level is median household income. It ranges from $46,260 to 
$86,290, an average of $56,990, which is also has a distribution that is slightly skewed to 
the right. Per capita income measured at the local level is also similarly skewed to the 
right. It ranges from $11,161 to $115,334 with an average of $32,000.  
Among the four employment groups used in this study, most localities show 
higher average employment in the growth-sector and the service-sector, each group 
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making almost 30 percent of the total employment. Average employment in the 
manufacturing and the technology sectors are 14 percent and 16 percent respectively. The 
percentages are comparable when aggregated at the MSA level as well. The 
manufacturing sector and service sector show more variation across localities as 
compared to the growth and the technology sectors. Unemployment, however, has a very 
low dispersion of 2.87 percent and 1.29 percent measured at the local and MSA levels 
respectively. Average unemployment in the selected localities is about 7 percent.  
Other measures of economic vitality used here are education and median home 
value. The percentage of population with graduate degrees measured at the local-
government level ranges from 0 to 48.69. On an average, about 13 percent graduate-
degree holders live in the selected localities. The skews in the data show that while a 
majority of localities have their percentage of graduate population near the average, very 
few of them have extremely high percentage of residents with higher education.  
Median home value also has similar characteristics: an average of $271,865.55, a 
minimum of $33,600, and a maximum of $1 million. The very fact that all these metrics 
of economic vitality have high variations and are skewed to the right suggests the 
possibility of considerable inequalities among localities within metropolitan areas.  
This study uses various measures of inequalities. One of them is the Gini 
coefficient of income inequality. Comparing household income among census-designated 
income cohorts of population across the metropolitan region shows that the Gini 
coefficient varies from 0.36 to 0.52. A value near zero means perfect equality, whereas a 
value near 1 suggests perfect inequality.  
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Income inequality within localities has also been measured through categorization 
of population by income. On average, localities have about 25 percent of poor people. 
Some localities have poor populations as low as 1.76 percent and some as high as 66.6 
percent.  Comparing this to the numbers aggregated at the metropolitan scale shows that 
sharp differences between localities are dulled when measured at regional levels. The 
data shows that about 21 percent poor people reside in metropolitan regions with a 
minimum of 14.7 percent and a maximum of 26.69 percent.  
Similarly, the average percentages of middle-class people and rich people in 
localities are about 35 percent and 40 percent respectively. The middle-class population 
varies from 4.56 percent to 62.05 percent, while rich varies from 6.62 percent to 90.1 
percent respectively. Variations measured at the aggregate metropolitan scale are much 
lower than this. The middle-class population in MSAs ranges from about 14 percent to 40 
percent, averaging 30 percent. Likewise, the percentage of rich people ranges from 36 to 
62 averaging 49 percent measured at the MSA level. This probably suggests that while 
regions as a whole do not seem unequal, individual localities are highly segregated with 
respect to economic classes. 
Fiscal stress, measured as a ratio between total expenditure of the locality and the 
total revenue of localities, ranges from 0.108 to 9.79 with an average of 1.0. The average 
suggests that the expenses of most localities are comparable to revenues. Minimum and 
maximum values suggest that localities spend 10 times less than what they earn while 
others spend almost 10 times more than their total revenue.   
In terms of race, the selected localities have an average of 11 percent African-
American population with a minimum of 0.17 percent and a maximum of almost 94 
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percent. Similarly, the average percentage of whites is 76.61, ranging from 1.96 percent 
to 100 percent. Southlake City in Tarrant County within the Dallas-Fort Worth 
metropolitan region has a 100 percent white population, whereas Robbins Village in 
Cook County in the Chicago-Joliet-Naperville metropolitan region has a 94 percent black 
population. Homogeneity, which has been calculated as the absolute difference in 
percentage between whites and African-Americans, ranges from 0.01 to 98.73 with an 
average value of 69.0. This suggests that the average difference between the percentage 
of whites and the blacks in the selected localities is 69 percent. The homogeneity scale 
ranges from 0 to 100, 0 being perfectly heterogeneous and 100 being perfectly 
homogenous. 
The senior demographic in the locality averages around 13 percent with ranges 
from 0.47 to 96.43 percent. When aggregating at the metropolitan level, the percentage of 
the senior population ranges from 8 percent to about 17 percent with an average of about 
12 percent. The distribution shows tremendous skewedness when measured at the local 
level.  
The study uses age of the locality to control for the variations between older and 
newer localities. Age of the locality is measured through the median year of the built 
structure, which ranges from 7 years to 71 years. The average age of localities is around 
37 years and the dispersion within the data is almost 15 years. The median metropolitan 
age averages 35.6 years with a minimum of 16 years and a maximum of 57 years.  
In all respects, variables measured at the local level provide sharper contrast 
compared to those collected at the metropolitan level because the extreme values 
measured at the local level become diluted while aggregating and averaging at the MSA 
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level. Interaction among localities is the focus of this study. Most of the analysis is 
focused on comparing characteristics of the localities. However, local characteristics such 
as fragmentation and Gini are calculated using MSA data to measure variation among 
localities across the region.    
 
Bivariate Correlations 
This section examines Pearson’s bivariate correlations between research 
variables, and this study uses bivariate correlations as a diagnostic tool. The primary 
focus is to understand preliminary relationships between variables intended to be used in 
multivariate regression. The very high correlation coefficient between pairs of variables 
suggests possibility of multicollinearity effects later in multivariate models. This 
information will be used to either completely remove some affected variables from 
regression models or stagger those pairs of variables in different models if they need to 
be used at all. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present Pearson’s correlation matrices for variables 
measured at MSA and local levels respectively. 
In the table with variables representing MSA characteristics, the dependent 
variable—Intergovernmental Revenue (logged)—does not seem to have questionably 
higher correlations with any of the predictor variables. However, a few cautionary 
relationships among the variables are worth mentioning here. The Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of metropolitan areas is correlated with population. This means that 
metropolitan regions with a greater population have a higher GDP as well. This 
relationship is too obvious. To avoid spurious correlations further in the analysis, GDP 
has been transformed into GDP per capita by normalizing it with the population of 
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metropolitan areas. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the (log of) GDP per 
capita with (log of) population is 0.22 after the transformation. This is shown in Table 
4.9.  
Pairs of variables like emptechpc-hhincom, graduatepc-emptechpc, homogeneity-
blackpc, gini-hhincome, and gini-graduatepc have bivariate correlation coefficients 
upwards of 0.8. Naturally, the percentage of the graduate population correlates strongly 
with employment in the technical sector since most technical jobs require an educated 
and skilled workforce.  
Homogeneity is calculated using the absolute difference between the white 
population and the African-American population. Both, white and black variables can be 
expected to highly correlate with homogeneity.  
Similarly, in the dataset with variables representing characteristics of local 
governments, the percentage of the population with graduate degrees correlates with per 
capita income. This relationship is also obvious since higher education generally enables 
one to get better paying jobs. 
These obvious correlations are duly noted and those variables are staggered in 






Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for Variables Measured at the MSA Level 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Log I-L Revenue 1                   
2 Fragmentation -.2 1                  
3 Government Density .11 .53 1                 
4 Log Population .66 -.23 .33 1                
5 Log GDP .62 -.24 .34 .96 1               
6 Log HH Income .31 -.28 .04 .37 .51 1              
7 Emp. Growth pc -.29 .03 -.06 -.04 -.02 -.15 1             
8 Emp. Tech pc .29 -.2 .01 .36 .51 .80 .00 1            
9 Emp. Manufacture pc -.15 .40 .37 -.10 -.05 -.07 -.24 -.22 1           
10 Emp. Service pc -.01 .15 .29 -.10 -.06 .21 -.20 .17 -.11 1          
11 Graduate pc .21 -.08 .23 .23 .39 .82 -.27 .82 -.00 .51 1         
12 Home Value .5 -.37 .04 .42 .5 .79 -.26 .62 -.12 -.00 .59 1        
13 Race Black pc .04 -.05 -.08 -.07 -.06 -.23 -.05 -.15 -.05 .11 -.11 -.31 1       
14 Race White pc -.48 .49 .27 -.34 -.38 -.40 .28 -.29 .21 .23 -.18 -.52 -.45 1      
15 Homogeneity -.32 .32 .21 -.16 -.19 -.10 .20 -.08 .16 .07 -.04 -.13 -.84 .86 1     
16 Poor pc .18 -.09 -.08 .16 .14 .04 -.01 -.02 .14 -.41 -.16 .07 .07 -.29 -.22 1    
17 Middle Class pc -.15 .10 -.01 -.06 -.09 -.07 .34 -.12 -.02 .02 -.19 -.28 -.03 .35 .23 .41 1   
18 Rich pc -.19 .26 .21 -.24 -.21 -.19 -.19 -.11 .17 .29 .09 -.14 .12 .15 .02 -.73 -.71 1  
19 Gini .21 -.10 .18 .14 .28 .88 -.32 .68 .04 .43 .86 .67 -.23 -.19 .01 -.06 -.09 .01 1 
20 Age MSA .14 .26 .71 .14 .16 .07 -.42 -.06 .38 .53 .33 .16 -.09 .23 .19 -.24 -.18 .38 .35 






Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for Variables Measured at Local Level 
 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Log I-L Revenue 1               
2 Log Population .50 1              
3 Log Per capita Income -.01 -.03 1             
4 Emp. Growth pc -.01 -.03 .17 1            
5 Emp. Tech pc .10 .09 .62 .39 1           
6 Emp. Manufacture pc -.17 -.16 -.30 .16 -.23 1          
7 Emp. Service pc -.01 -.06 .15 .38 .34 -.02 1         
8 Graduate pc .03 -.00 .85 -.01 .62 -.43 .22 1        
9 Home Value -.00 .08 .70 .16 .54 -.33 .08 .61 1       
10 Race Black pc .15 .17 -.33 -.22 -.13 -.16 .03 -.17 -.26 1      
11 Race White pc -.20 -.32 .32 .22 .01 .20 .04 .15 -.00 -.79 1     
12 Homogeneity -.23 -.36 .29 .16 .00 .18 .03 .13 .05 -.67 .83 1    
13 Poor pc -.05 -.17 .19 .14 .08 -.02 .33 .13 .03 -.11 .23 .20 1   
14 Middle Class pc .07 .03 -.44 .07 -.05 .10 .17 -.34 -.25 .31 -.31 -.28 .19 1  
15 Rich pc -.10 -.10 -.16 .44 .12 .30 .40 -.26 -.05 -.01 .02 .03 .26 .57 1 
16 Age Locality -.01 -.09 .01 -.12 .07 -.11 .26 .16 .04 .16 -.17 -.14 .29 .30 .12 
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Robust Coefficients of Regional Variables 
This section examines the causal effects of the local characteristic on interlocal 
cooperation controlling for cumulative effects of other variables.  Models 1 and 2 
examine the effects of variables measured at the MSA level on aggregate interlocal 
revenue. Models 3, 4, and 5 examine similar correlations between the variables measured 
at the local-government level. The coefficients and relevant statistics for Models 1 and 2 
are presented in Table 4.8.  
Among all the variables used in Model 1, population and homogeneity generate 
coefficients significant at confidence interval of 99 percent. Government density and the 
binary variable representing localities in the South reach statistical significance at 95 
percent confidence interval. Similarly, fragmentation, GDP per capita, median household 
income, and percent employment in the technology sector produce robust coefficients 
that are significant at 90 percent confidence interval. The Gini coefficient, which 
measures the income inequality within an MSA, cannot produce a statistically significant 
coefficient. The coefficient for the age of the MSA is also not significant statistically; 
however, it still needs to be retained in the model since it is one of the control variables. 
The model has r-squared value of .637 and an adjusted r-squared value of .546. 
The value of r-squared suggests that the model is able to explain almost 64 percent of the 
variation caused by the included independent variables on interlocal cooperation. 
Adjusted r-squared has been calculated to control the inflation in r-squared caused by the 
inclusion of statistically insignificant but analytically relevant variables. The adjusted r-
squared suggests that even if statistically insignificant variables are removed from the 





  Table 4.8 





































 Variables Model 1 
 
Model 2 
Fragmentation .012   (.231)* 
 
.024 (.252)** 
Gov. Density -.058  (-.45)** 
 
-.063 (-.404)* 
Homogeneity -.015  (-.50)*** 
 
x 
South -.577  (-.684)** 
 
x 
GMP Per Capita(log) -.468  (-.763)* 
 
x 
HH Income (log) -3.07  (-.659)* 
 
-.255(-.059) 
Emp. Tech. pc .131   (.269)* 
 
x 
Gini 8.72   (.367) 
 
x 
White pc x 
 
-.015 (-.271)* 
Age of MSA -.004  (-.114) 
 
.011 (.012) 













DV = Interlocal Revenue Transfers (Log10) 
p<.01***, .01<p<.05** , .05<p<.1* 
( ) = values in parentheses are standardized coefficients 































Standardized residuals vs. Robust Distances















Normal Q-Q vs. Residuals
















Response vs. Fitted Values















Residuals vs. Fitted Values
Figure 4.1 







Regression Diagnostics for Model 1, Correlations 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 IL Rev (log) 1          
2 Pop (log) .59 1         
3 Govt. density -.01 .33 1        
4 Homogeneity -.32 -.16 .21 1       
5 GDP per capita (log) .00 .22 .16 -.17 1      
6 HH Income (log) .22 .37 .04 -.10 .62 1     
7 Emp. Tech. pc .23 .36 .01 -.08 .65 .80 1    
8 Gini .10 .14 .18 .01 .55 .88 .68 1   
9 Age of  MSA -.01 .14 .71 .19 .12 .07 -.06 .35 1  
10 White pc -.44 -.34 .27 .86 -.27 -.40 -.29 -.19 .23 1 




Population is the most influential variable in the model with a standardized beta 
coefficient of 1.54. This means that one unit change in population causes an increase in 
interlocal revenue by 1.54 times its standard deviation. Besides representing the size of 
metropolitan areas, population variable also works as a control variable in the model.  
The second most influential variable is the per capita gross domestic product of 
the metropolitan area (GDP), which has a negative standardized beta coefficient of -.763. 
This suggests that a unit increase in per capita GMP causes a decrease in interlocal 
cooperation by a factor of .76 of its standard deviation.  
Household income also shows a similar negative causal link with interlocal 
cooperation. The results suggest that increase in household income causes a decrease in 
interlocal revenue by almost 66 percent of its standard dispersion.  
Similarly, increase in racial homogeneity by twice its standard deviation is found 
to decrease interlocal cooperation by one standard deviation. Government density also 
has a negative relationship with interlocal cooperation where increase in density by 1 
percent of its standard deviation causes a decrease in interlocal revenue by half of its 
standard dispersion.  
A second model is run using metropolitan data focused on prominent economic, 
racial, and fragmentation information from the first model. This model uses the 
percentage of white population instead of the homogeneity index to measure the effects 
of race in interlocal cooperation. This model attains a r-squared of .51. After adjustment 
for unresponsive variables, the model is still able to explain 44 percent of variations 
caused by the selected MSA characteristics on aggregate interlocal cooperation.  
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The coefficient for fragmentation index gets better in this model whereas median- 
household income loses its predictive power. Fragmentation is positively correlated with 
interlocal cooperation with an impact factor of almost 25 percent of its standard 
deviation.  
Similarly, percent of white population shows a negative correlation with interlocal 
cooperation. As  the percentage of white population increases by one standard deviation, 
there is a corresponding decrease in interlocal cooperation by a factor of .27 of its 
standard deviation. This relationship is statistically significant at 90 percent confidence 
interval.  
The density of government has the same directional relationship and retains 
almost the same predictive power as in the first model. These findings partially support 
the arguments laid out in the first hypothesis of this study. Fragmentation produces 
significant positive coefficients as hypothesized, but the proximity variable shows a 
directional relationship different than what was expected. These relationships will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
Economic variables are found to behave in accordance with the expected 
relationships. Gross metropolitan product and household income both produce negative 
coefficients and substantially higher beta coefficients. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis related to economic distress and how it forces localities to cooperate. 
Employment in the technological sector, however, produces statistically significant 
positive coefficient. This reflects localities’ attempt to reap joint benefits in information 
and technology sectors.  
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Finally, the binary variable representing metropolitan areas in the South produces 
a significantly strong negative coefficient suggesting that these MSAs are less likely to 
engage in interlocal cooperation compared to their counterparts in the Northeast, Midwest 
and the West. This is hardly a surprise as the result is quite consistent with Elazar’s 
categorization of regions where the South is generally considered to have a 
traditionalistic political culture and to be more conservative (Elazar, 1972).  
Regression models and the coefficients are sufficiently reliable. A number of 
diagnostic tests are carried out to verify the significance of the coefficients. Figure 4.1 
shows plots between standardized residuals and robust distances. It shows the presence of 
some outliers in the data. These outliers are real data points with real significance in the 
research and not data errors. This is why robust methods are employed to keep them in 
the analysis while preventing them from skewing the correlations. The normal q-q plot 
has also been generated, and it shows that the residuals are generally distributed 
normally, implying that the model satisfies the normality assumption of linear regression. 
In addition, the plot between the residuals and fitted values show a random relationship, 
which implies that no internal biases exist between the research variables, which further 
adds to the robustness of the model. A correlation matrix between variables included in 
the first model is presented in Table 4.11, which shows the absence of collinearity among 
the model variables. 
 
Robust Coefficients of Local Variables 
Models 3, 4, and 5 compare various characteristics of localities against the 
variable representing interlocal cooperation. Table 4.10 lists model statistics including 
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robust coefficients, standardized robust coefficients, significances, and the goodness of 
fit. Model 3 is the base model for variables measured at the local level. It includes most 
of the statistically significant research variables along with the control variables. Models 
4 and 5 stagger potentially spurious variables in Model 3 and help to further clarify the 
relationships. Figure 4.3 presents diagnostic plots, and Table 4.11 presents the correlation 
matrix of the variables included in Model 3.  
Model 3 shows relationship between socioeconomic, political, and geographic 
characteristics and interlocal cooperation.  Most of the included variables produce 
statistically significant robust coefficients. Variables such as population, home value, 
middle class, income, and poverty produce coefficients at 99 percent confidence interval. 
Employment in the growth sector produces coefficients at 95 percent confidence interval, 
whereas rich, senior population and employment in manufacturing sector produce 
coefficients significant at 90 percent confidence interval. The variable representing 
localities in the South slightly misses the significance bracket, whereas the variable 
representing age of the city is not significant at all. The model converges with an r-
squared of .34 and an adjusted r-squared of .33. This suggests that the predictors used in 
the model are able to explain 34 percent of variance in the dependent variable. Even after 
correcting for the effects of insignificant variables in the model, it explains 33 percent of 
the variance.  
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Table 4.10  
Robust Coefficients at Local Level 
 Variables Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Population (log) .878 (.572)*** .787 (.486)*** .808 (.497)*** 
Per Capita Income (log) 1.58 (.25)*** 1.47 (.199)*** 1.00 (.148)** 
Middle Class pc -.04 (-.194)*** x x 
Home Value (log) -.293 (-.179)*** -.29 (-.158)*** -.223 (-.127)*** 
Poor pc .029 (.158)*** x .015 (.053)* 
City .32 (.156)*** x x 
Rich pc -.026 (-.072)* -.017 (-.081)* x 
Emp. Manu pc -.02 (-.07)* x x 
Senior pc (logit) .168 (.068)* x x 
Emp. Growth pc .026 (.002)** x x 
Age of City -.001(-.02) x x 
South -.033 (-.023) x x 
Graduate pc x x .01 (.10) 
White pc x -.003 (-.03)* x 
Black pc x x .002 (.007) 
Intercept -4.20** -3.33** -2.78** 
r-squared .342 .285 .284 
Adj. r-squared .335 .281 .281 
Notes: 
DV = Interlocal Revenue Transfers (Log10) 
p<.01***, .01<p<.05** , .05<p<.1* 
( ) = values in parentheses are standardized coefficients 















Regression Diagnostics for Model 2, Correlations 
 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 I-L Rev (log) 1            
2 Pop (log) .50 1           
3 Homeval (log) -.00 .081 1          
4 MClass pc -.10 -.1 -.05 1         
5 Income (log) -.00 -.03 .7 -.16 1        
6 Poor pc .07 -.07 -.25 .57 -.44 1       
7 Emp. Growth pc -.01 -.03 .16 .44 .17 .07 1      
8 Rich pc -.05 -.07 .48 -.13 .79 -.34 .27 1     
9 Senior pc (logit) -.05 -.17 .03 .26 .19 .19 .14 .23 1    
10 Emp. Manu pc -.17 -.16 -.33 .30 -.3 .1 .16 -.08 -.02 1   
11 Age of City -.01 -.09 .04 .12 .01 .3 -.12 -.07 .29 -.11 1  
12 White pc -.20 -.32 -.009 .02 .32 -.31 .22 .37 .26 .20 -.17 1 
13 Black pc .15 .17 -.26 -.01 -.33 .31 -.22 -.33 -.12 -.16 .16 -.79 
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As with Models 1 and 2, this model also reports local economic characteristic as 
one of the strongest predictors of interlocal cooperation. The standardized beta coefficient 
for per capita income in Model 3 is .25, which means that an increase of one standard 
deviation in per capita income can cause a corresponding increase in interlocal revenue 
by nearly a quarter of its standard deviation.  
Percentage of middle-class population is another variable that produces strong 
beta coefficients. One standard deviation increase in the percentage of middle-class 
population corresponds to a decrease in interlocal revenue by nearly 20 percent of its 
standard deviation.  
Home value is the fourth most influential variable in the model, and it also has 
negative correlation with interlocal revenue. One percent increase in home value within a 
locality corresponds to nearly .18 percent decrease in its interlocal revenue.  
The percentage of poor people in a locality is positively correlated with interlocal 
cooperation. A unit increase in the percentage of poor people corresponds to almost .15 
percent increase in interlocal revenue. Percentage of rich people, on the other hand, 
correlates negatively with interlocal cooperation. A 100 percent increase in rich 
population corresponds to only 7.2-percent-point decrease in interlocal revenue. The 
relationship is statistically significant at 90 percent confidence interval.  
Employment in manufacturing sector is also negatively correlated with interlocal 
cooperation. Its influence factor is negative 7 percent. Employment in growth sector, on 
the other hand, correlates positively with interlocal cooperation, and the relationship is 
also very significant statistically. However, the influence factor of this variable is just 
about .02 percent.  
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Similarly, an increase in the percentage of the senior population in a locality 
corresponds to an increase in interlocal cooperation. As percentage of senior population 
increases by one standard deviation, interlocal revenue increases by nearly 7 percent of 
its standard deviation.  
Even though type of local government has just been used as a control variable, it 
produces a statistically significant coefficient that is worth mentioning. Compared to 
localities designated as county or township, a city or a municipality has 15 percent more 
probability of engaging in interlocal cooperation. 
Models 4 and 5 more closely examine the relationship of social characteristics 
with interlocal cooperation. Suspecting possible collinearity between income classes and 
racial groups, these two models stagger those variables and compare the results with the 
base model. Population, per capita income, and average home value are variables that 
produce the strongest coefficients in Model 3. These three variables are retained in 
Models 4 and 5 as well. Economic classes correlate with one another, hence they cannot 
be analyzed together in the same model. Model 4 evaluates the correlation between the 
percentage of rich people on interlocal cooperation, while Model 5 examines the same 
relationship using percentage of poor people. Similarly, the variable representing the 
percentage of white population is used in Model 4 whereas black percentage is used in 
Model 5. Both models attain coefficients of determination (r-squared) of 0.28 suggesting 
that the independent variables used in both models are able to explain more than 28 
percent of the variation in interlocal cooperation.  
Per capita income and median home value produce coefficients that are 
statistically significant at 99 percent confidence interval in Model 4. Per capita income is 
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positively correlated with interlocal cooperation with an influence factor of nearly 20 
percent. However, median home value is negatively correlated with interlocal 
cooperation. One unit increase in median home value causes interlocal cooperation to 
decrease by almost 15 percent of its standard deviation.  
Likewise, percentage of rich people and percentage of white population produce 
coefficients significant at 90 percent confidence interval.  Both variables are negatively 
correlated with interlocal cooperation. One standard deviation increase in the percentage 
of rich people causes a corresponding decrease in interlocal revenue by about 8 percent of 
its standard deviation. Percentage of white population similarly causes a negative 3 
percent change in interlocal cooperation. The effects caused by percentage of rich people 
and the percentage of white people on interlocal cooperation are small but are statistically 
significant.   
The coefficient for median home value reaches statistical significance at 99 
percent confidence interval in Model 5. Per capita income attains a significance at 95 
percent confidence interval, and the percentage of poor people produces coefficient at 90 
percent confidence interval. The coefficients produced by percentage of graduate 
population and the percentage of black population do not attain statistical significance. 
As per capita income increases by one standard deviation, it causes interlocal revenue to 
increase by nearly 15 percent of its standard deviation. As with the previous two models, 
increase in median home value causes interlocal revenue to decrease, and the influence 
factor is about 12 percent of its standard dispersion. The increase in the percentage of 
poor people in the jurisdiction, however, causes interlocal revenue to increase by a factor 
of 5 percent.  
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The base model satisfies the conditions of linear regression.  Plot of standardized 
residuals and robust distances show a number of outliers in the dataset. Robust 
coefficients are hardly influenced by the presence of outliers. The q-q plot of residuals 
versus theoretical values presented in Figure 4.3 shows a nearly perfect normal 
distribution of the residuals. Another plot showing the relationship between the residuals 
and fitted values tells that they are fairly independent and random. These diagnostics 
show that the regression model satisfies all assumptions and is better able to predict the 
relationship between independent variables and the dependent variable. Additionally, the 
correlation matrix of model variables presented in Table 4.11 demonstrates the absence 
of collinearity between variables.  
 
Summary of Results 
 Table 4.12 presents the summary of findings from the quantitative analysis. The 
table lays out all variables used in robust models and their hypothesized relationship with 
the variable representing interlocal cooperation. The table also lists standardized beta 
coefficients of all variables, their direction of association, and statistical significances. 
The last column in the table indicates whether the hypothesized directions of 
relationships are substantiated by the analysis. The following chapter is dedicated to the 













Local  MSA Outcome as 
Expected beta Sig.  beta Sig. 
Fragmentation  +ve - -  .252 ** Y 
Government Density +ve - -  -.45 ** N 
GMP -ve - -  -.763 * Y 
Per Capita Income -ve .25 ***  - - N 
Household Income -ve - -  -.659 * Y 
        
Emp. in Growth Sector -ve .002 **  - - N 
Emp. in Tech Sector -ve - -  .269 * N 
Emp. in Manufacture Sector -ve -.07 *  - - Y 
Home Value -ve -.179 ***  - - Y 
Homogeneity +ve - -  -.5 *** N 
        
Senior Population +ve .068 *  - - Y 
White percent -ve -.03 *  -.271 * Y 
Poor +ve .158 ***  - - Y 
Middle Class +ve -.194 ***  - - N 
Rich -ve -.072 *  - - Y 
        
Gini -ve    .367 - N 
Size (Population) -ve .572 ***  1.54 *** - 
Age of City/MSA - -.02 -  -.114 - - 
City - .156 ***  - - - 










 This chapter revisits theories and hypotheses laid out in Chapters II and III in light 
of the findings from data analysis. Table 4.12 presented at the end of the previous chapter 
summarizes the relationships between local characteristics and interlocal cooperation. 
This chapter analyzes those results and puts them in the context of the hypotheses laid out 
for this study.  
The dependent variable–local intergovernmental cooperation–is measured using 
information on interlocal monetary transfers. The study considers any form of interlocal 
transfer of funds to be the measure of cooperation among localities. The extent of 
interlocal revenue of localities depends on various urban services and infrastructure sold 
to their neighbors, funds received as payments on joint ventures, and funds received as 
fulfillment of a tax-sharing covenant that exists between them.  The descriptive summary 
of the data shows that on average localities receive approximately $80 per capita in 
interlocal revenue. About 4 percent of total revenue of localities comes from 
intergovernmental transfers. Some localities receive as little as .001 percent while others 
receive as much as 63 percent of their revenue from other local governments. Among the 




municipalities report the highest percentage of interlocal revenue, followed by townships, 
and then by counties.  
 
Fragmentation and Interlocal Cooperation 
Metropolitan fragmentation is the foundation of variation across urban regions. 
Fragmentation is an outcome of lifestyle choices made by the population. 
Consolidationists often tout fragmentation as an insurmountable hurdle against regional 
collective action and suggest that dissolving political boundaries is the best way to 
address inequalities (Aron, 1969; Peirce, Johnson, & Hall, 1993; Rusk, 1993, 1999, 2003; 
Wood, 1961). This manuscript considers metropolitan fragmentation as an opportunity 
rather than a problem. On one hand, it serves the purpose of creating choices for people–
thus enhancing local democracy, and on the other hand, it increases the potential for 
regional collective action by increasing the number of participants. Results obtained from 
the analysis fully support this hypothesis. Analysis of data at the regional level reveals 
strong causal link between fragmentation and interlocal cooperation.  
Fragmentation creates localities with diversity of demand for public services and 
the ability of residents to pay for those services. With the presence of a multitude of 
service producers and providers in the region, localities can easily cooperate with those 
that have similar preferences for the type and quality of public services and are willing to 
jointly reap the benefits of scale economy.   
The literature also claims that fragmentation enables rich people to prevent the 
poor from getting access to richer and better-served localities by implementing 




and to keep taxes low (Downs, 1994; Ledebur & Barnes, 1992). Fragmentation has also 
been suggested to be an outcome of peoples’ choice for racially homogenous 
communities (Burns, 1994). Fragmentation is considered to be the result of urban 
residents voting with their feet in favor of better-served communities (Tiebout, 1956), 
which connotes a constant state of competition among neighboring localities. On the 
grounds of these theories, preferences for racial segregation and economic 
competitiveness do not seem to support interlocal cooperation. However, the fact that 
fragmentation is still strongly correlated with interlocal cooperation after controlling for 
the effects of income and race suggests that other centripetal forces are stronger than the 
centrifugal push created by racial and economic segregation. It suggests that benefits 
accrued through the economies of scale in service production and through sharing risks 
by engaging in joint ventures far outweigh the costs of competitive behavior among 
fragmented localities. The results of this study also support the findings of Johnson and 
Neiman (2004) in which they conduct a survey of the managers of local governments and 
find that localities do cooperate with their neighbors whom they consider to be their 
competitors.   
 The relationship between regional fragmentation and interlocal cooperation 
reported by this manuscript is different from the findings presented by Post (2002). This 
study does not support her claim that fragmentation negatively influences interlocal 
cooperation. The primary reason can be attributed to the methods used in measurement of 
interlocal cooperation. She uses event-count of interlocal monetary transfers as her 
dependent variable whereas this study measures the magnitude of interlocal revenue 




which could be one reason for the difference between Post’s (2002) findings and the 
findings of this study.  
The outcome of this research regarding the relationship between fragmentation 
and interlocal cooperation also contradicts the findings of Olberding (2002b) and 
Hawkins (2010). They report fragmentation to be negatively correlated with partnership 
for economic development. The differences in findings may be attributed to the 
differences in measurement of the dependent variable. Both operationalize interlocal 
cooperation in the form of a dichotomous variable, that has shortcomings already 
discussed.  
By utilizing an appropriate measurement for the extent of interlocal cooperation 
among localities, this analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that metropolitan 
fragmentation helps to enhance interlocal cooperation among localities. The null 
hypothesis that fragmentation does not affect interlocal cooperation is therefore rejected. 
 
Geographic Proximity and Interlocal Cooperation 
Based on Axelrod’s (1984) theory of cooperation, this study expected to find a 
higher magnitude of cooperation among localities that are geographically nearer one 
another. However, the findings from the data do not support this hypothesis. In this study, 
geographic proximity is operationalized as density of governments measured in terms of 
the number of local governments within 100 square miles. The robust coefficients 
between proximity and interlocal cooperation are negative and are statistically 
significant. This suggests that an increase in the number of governments per unit area 




between the two variables. Hence, the null hypothesis that geographically proximate 
localities do not engage in more interlocal cooperation is accepted.  
City centers are areas where local government densities can be expected to be 
higher. Suburbs are by nature sprawled and occupy large geographic areas, thereby 
having lower government densities. Area-wide public authorities and special districts 
typically take up public-service delivery as well as economic-development 
responsibilities in central areas. In the areas where public authorities control land-use 
decisions and special districts provide public services, general purpose local governments 
do not need to engage in direct cooperation with one another. This could explain the 
anomaly in findings of this study regarding proximity and interlocal cooperation. 
However, any claim regarding the effects of special governments on cooperative 
activities between general-purpose local governments is out of the scope of this study.  
Further analysis will be needed to evaluate this theory.  
The expected relationship of the geographic proximity of local governments and 
the extent of interlocal cooperation among them could not be substantiated from the data. 
The null hypothesis that geographic proximity among local governments does not 
influence interlocal cooperation is therefore accepted. 
 
Economic Condition and Interlocal Cooperation 
 Gross domestic product per capita, median household income, per capita income, 
employment, property value, and the index of fiscal distress are variables used to measure 




Gross domestic product per capita is the measure of overall economic 
performance of metropolitan region. This study finds that regional economy negatively 
influences interlocal cooperation. As the GDP per capita of a region increases, the 
aggregate transfer of interlocal revenue among the localities in the region decreases. 
Conversely, decrease in regional economic performance enables more cooperation among 
localities. This suggests that localities are affected by the economic condition of the 
metropolitan region, and the distressed ones respond by purchasing as much urban 
services from their neighbors as possible, rather than trying to produce their own. The 
findings suggest that localities resort to cooperative measures when they collectively face 
economic distress. This also substantiates the theory proposed by Savitch et al. (1993) 
that local economies are connected to the regional economy.  
Just as GDP per capita measures economic strength of the metropolitan region, 
per capita income of localities represents economic vitality at local level. Increase in local 
per capita income is found to strongly correlate with increase in interlocal revenue. This 
implies that as localities become economically stronger, they develop increased capacity 
to produce and export urban services. It is possible that localities with thriving economy 
produce and sell urban services to their less affluent neighbors. However, this argument 
cannot be fully substantiated until the demand side of this relationship is evaluated by 
examining information regarding intergovernmental expenditure of the neighboring 
localities.  
Employment is another measure of economic vitality used in the study. Increase 
in employment opportunities is a sign of a growing economy. This research expected to 




different employment sectors influence interlocal cooperation differently. Percentage 
employment in growth- and technology-sectors report positive correlations with 
interlocal cooperation, whereas percentage employment in manufacturing-sector reports a 
negative correlation. These variables produce significant coefficients even when 
controlled for spurious effects by including them all in the same analytical model. 
Percentage employment in the service sector does not produce significant coefficients in 
any of the models. 
Growth-sectors such as construction, finance, insurance, real estate, and 
technology-sectors such as information services, telecommunication, research, and 
development are generally considered developmental activities. The transaction-cost 
theory suggests that localities engage in cooperation when it is cheaper to do so 
(Williamson, 1979). This study finds that localities cooperate with one another for 
collective growth in developmental sector. It is perhaps more beneficial for localities to 
cooperate in economic development than to engage in unnecessary competition that 
undermines their regional and global competitiveness. This finding contradicts Peterson’s 
(1981) theory about interlocal relationship where he suggests that engagement in 
developmental activities by localities is generally a sign of interlocal competition.  
 However, employment in manufacturing-sector is negatively correlated with 
interlocal cooperation. Manufacturing-sector claims only about 15 percent of jobs in the 
localities selected for this study while they have nearly 45 percent jobs in the technology 
sector and the growth sector combined. The transition of cities from a manufacturing-
based economy to a service- and information-based economy between 1970 and 2000 




reported that urban industrial jobs either moved out of the urban economic region or 
altogether moved to a different country in search of cheap land and labor (Downs, 1994; 
Ledebur & Barnes, 1992; Nivola, 1999). Localities that have not transitioned to a service 
economy and that continue to depend on manufacturing establishments to enhance their 
local economy may still follow the Petersonian logic of interlocal competition. That 
explains the negative correlation between employment in the manufacturing sector and 
interlocal cooperation.  
Household income is found to have a strong negative correlation with interlocal 
cooperation. A 1 percent increase in household income corresponds to a 0.6 percent 
decrease in interlocal revenue. Household income is different from per capita income in 
the way it measures actual family earnings from wages and benefits. Per capita income is 
the total earning of an economic region divided by total population and consequently 
does not necessarily represent families’ real disposable income. Per capita GDP and 
income represent the aggregate economic production of the selected unit of analysis 
whereas household income is an indicator of the standard of living. A higher disposable 
income allows families to spend more on lifestyle amenities and services. Families with 
higher disposable incomes are expected to vote with their feet in search of better lifestyle 
services according to the Tieboutean model. The finding of this study suggests that 
families with more disposable income do not support the idea of their government 
cooperating with neighboring localities, which is consistent with the public-choice theory 





Property value is another measure of lifestyle choice. Localities with better 
lifestyle amenities generally have higher property values, which also serve as a proxy for 
fiscal vitality of the local government since higher property values in the locality bring 
higher tax revenues to the local government. Property value is found to be negatively 
correlated with interlocal cooperation, suggesting that localities endowed with nicer 
properties and consequently higher local revenues are reluctant to engage in cooperation 
with their neighbors. Conversely, it suggests that localities that experience lower property 
values and consequently lower tax revenue engage in interlocal cooperation. 
Low household income and lower property value are both signs of a distressed 
economy. Lower property value translates into lower revenue from taxes. Similarly, 
lower disposable income of families translates into subsistence retail activities and low 
levels of lifestyle retail expenditures. Such localities have fewer luxury establishments 
such as outlet malls, fine dining, health clubs, and entertainment centers and they 
generate less revenue. Their residents have increased demands for public infrastructure 
and other social-benefit programs. Residents also face a higher tax burden, but the 
localities experience a lower tax-yield. Miller (1995) describes this situation as fiscal 
stress. It is hypothesized that localities facing economic and fiscal stress are more likely 
to cooperate with their neighbors. The negative correlation between interlocal 
cooperation and these distress variables substantiate the hypothesized relationship. This 
result is consistent with that of Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) and Leroux and Carr (2007). 
In light of the findings that localities cooperate more when faced with economic 




household income of the residents, the second hypothesis of this research that says 
economic distress forces localities to seek cooperative measures, is accepted. 
 
Race and Interlocal Cooperation 
 This study analyses the effects of race and income inequality of localities on 
interlocal cooperation. Besides representing racial makeup by measuring the percentage 
of white population and the percentage of African-American population, this study also 
measures the homogeneity of localities in terms of absolute difference between the 
percentages of the two races.  
The coefficients from the regression analysis using data collected at the 
metropolitan level suggests that interlocal cooperation decreases with increasing racial 
homogeneity. That is to say that the interlocal cooperation between localities within 
metropolitan areas increases if the metropolitan region is more heterogeneous. Results 
from Model 2 substantiate the finding that interlocal cooperation decreases with increase 
in the percentage of whites measured at metropolitan level. One standard deviation 
increase in percentage of white population corresponds to decrease in interlocal revenue 
by a factor of 0.27 of its standard deviation. This study expected to find a positive 
correlation between metropolitan racial homogeneity and regionally aggregated measure 
of interlocal cooperation based on the theory that racially homogenous localities can 
easily cooperate as they share similar preferences. The findings do not concur with the 
expected output.   
Consistent with the findings at metropolitan level, coefficient of racial 




cooperation. Increase in percentage of white people corresponds with decrease in 
interlocal revenue of localities.  Whites are conventionally considered rich compared to 
blacks. It is necessary to control for the spurious effect of income on the relationship 
between race and interlocal cooperation.   Therefore, the variable representing the 
percentage rich population is included in Model 4 to isolate the effect of race alone on 
cooperation. Similarly, since the black or African-American population is conventionally 
considered to be poor, the variable representing the percentage of poor people is included 
in Model 5 to control for the spurious effect of poverty. Despite robust controls, measure 
of percentage of whites is found to negatively correlate with interlocal cooperation, 
whereas percentage of blacks fails to produce statistically significant coefficient. This 
finding does not support the hypothesis of racial homophily and concludes that white 
people are reluctant to engage in local cooperation irrespective of neighboring localities’ 
racial makeup.  
 
Income Inequality and Interlocal Cooperation 
Income inequality is another social characteristic evaluated in this study. Just as is 
racial segregation, economic segregation is an outcome of metropolitan fragmentation. 
Localities have a disproportionate distribution of wealth. It has been hypothesized that 
increasing inequality between the rich and poor decreases interlocal cooperation. This 
study uses two metrics to measure the extent of income inequality within metropolitan 
regions: the Gini index and the percentage of population in different income classes.  
Gini represents the spread of wealth between the localities within the metropolitan 




interlocal cooperation is not statistically significant. Gini coefficient of the metropolitan 
areas selected for this study has standard deviation of 0.03. Considering that the value of 
Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, the data shows small dispersion of 3 percent. This 
suggests that the 51 largest metropolitan regions analyzed here have nearly similar index 
of income-inequality, which is why Gini index is not able to produce significant 
coefficients.  
However, variables measuring economic heterogeneity at the local government 
level represent sufficiently large sample size, have wider distribution, and produce 
significant robust coefficients. The study finds that increase in the percentage of rich 
people is negatively correlated while percentage of poor people is positively correlated 
with interlocal cooperation. Models 4 and 5 evaluate these variables separately and they 
still produce equally strong coefficients. These findings support the hypothesis that 
heterogeneity in income negatively affects interlocal cooperation. The results imply that 
poor people prefer cooperative methods of urban service delivery whereas rich people do 
not. Therefore, in an urban region where neighboring localities have heterogeneous 
income classes the condition of reciprocity needed for interlocal cooperation cannot be 
achieved. 
 
Size and Interlocal Cooperation 
 A locality’s population size has been found to be one of the best predictors of 
interlocal cooperation.  In each of the models, the population variable produces 
statistically significant coefficients. Coefficients of population in all but one model show 




interlocal cooperation increases by almost half of its standard deviation. Localities with 
larger populations have bigger markets for public services. Local governments of larger 
jurisdictions need to invest more in public-service provision than their smaller 
counterparts. However, with increasing population it is easier to lower per-unit costs 
because of the economies of scale. The bivariate correlation between per capita interlocal 
revenue and population shows a negative relationship that suggests that per capita 
interlocal transfer decreases with increase in population. Hence, service provision 
becomes less expensive for large localities when they cooperate with their neighbors. 
However, this study chose to use population as a control variable rather than a 
predictor. As the dependent variable is measured in terms of interlocal revenue, localities 
with higher populations naturally have more demand for public services, and therefore 
more interlocal revenue. Thus, size can have severe endogenous problems if interpreted 
as a predictor variable.  
 
Senior Population and Interlocal Cooperation 
 This study uses percentage of senior population to control for age variations 
between localities. This demographic group is conventionally found to actively 
participate in town-hall meetings and has also reported the highest turnout in elections.   
Senior population is found to have a statistically significant positive correlation with 
interlocal cooperation. One standard-deviation increase in percentage of senior 
population causes interlocal revenue to increase by about 0.7 percent of its standard 
deviation. The magnitude of this relationship is not very strong, but it does tell a good 




mobile in terms of their place of residence, they have limited sources of income, and they 
want to ensure uninterrupted services at the lowest possible cost in their chosen 
jurisdiction. Lower per capita cost for urban services is possible when economies of scale 
are achieved through cooperation.  
 
Age of the Economy and Interlocal Cooperation  
Age of the economy is another control variable in this study. Older cities tend to 
have more public infrastructure than their newer counterparts. The aging infrastructures 
of older cities have higher maintenance costs. Conversely, new localities have modern 
infrastructures and require less investment in maintenance and upkeep than older 
localities. It seems logical to assume that newer localities are better off cooperating with 
those that are older to provide urban infrastructure because it is cost effective to share 
than to produce it solely. However, this study does not provide conclusive a result about 
this issue. Age of the economy, which has been measured as the median age of built 












The need for local cooperation itself alludes to the existence of a large number of 
jurisdictions that enjoy their share of power of self-governance. The U.S.A. is founded on 
the principle of pluralism, and the culture of jurisdictional sovereignty that set its roots 
centuries ago during the era of independence still resonates in modern day politics, both 
state and local.  
American urban culture is predominantly polycentric. However, preference for 
autonomous urban governments has led to further fragmentation and demographic 
segregation. Sorting in terms of income and race has created a patchwork of localities 
with different levels of competitiveness. Competition among localities for mobile 
businesses and residents by attempting to lure them with credit-laden infrastructure and 
insurmountable economic benefits puts all of them in a downward spiral. Scholars have 
suggested consolidating smaller jurisdictions into one giant regional unit to end spillovers 
and correct the negative effects of policy differences. Some metropolitan areas have even 
embarked upon this experiment.  
The question of success or failure of consolidation still triggers engaging 
discussions among urban scholars but the issue remains inconclusive to date. Besides the 
uncertainty of its efficacy, consolidation is considered one of the most difficult methods 




hoc cooperation among localities. This is a system of random, temporary networks 
created on the basis of their specific needs and preferences. However, not all localities are 
found to engage in cooperation equally. The formation of cooperative networks is 
influenced by their political preferences, economic capacity, social structure, and 
geographical limitations.  
 
Why Do Some Localities Cooperate More Than Others? 
This research is a pursuit of identification of local characteristics that influence 
interlocal cooperation. It strives to find credible answer to why some localities cooperate 
more than others. This study uses robust methods designed to overcome the statistical 
limitations of previous studies done to identify local characteristics that influence 
interlocal cooperation. Using an aggregate data including more than two dozen variables 
measuring local characteristics of 1,164 localities within 51 largest metropolitan regions, 
this is one of the most comprehensive studies in its category.  
The study finds substantial evidence that political fragmentation of metropolitan 
regions has a positive effect on cooperation among localities. It finds conclusive proof 
that economic distress causes localities to seek partners for mutual cooperation. It also 
concludes that racial homogeneity and economic inequality decreases interlocal 
cooperation.  
Urban fragmentation is considered the cause of numerous urban problems. 
Concentration of the rich and poor in different urban pockets translates into fiscal 
disparities between the localities, which affect the capacities of those localities to produce 




area-wide regional governments to solve the problems associated with fragmentation, it 
requires relinquishing the power of self-governance by the localities, which makes it an 
unpopular choice. Localities can reap the benefits of regional governance by voluntarily 
engaging into cooperative relations with their neighbors without giving up their right to 
self-governance.  
Metropolitan fragmentation plays a dual role of segregating urban population into 
multiple and characteristically diverse local jurisdictions, while simultaneously creating 
multitude of localities that can engage in cooperative governance. This study finds 
credible evidence that the centripetal forces of cooperation are stronger than centrifugal 
forces of segregation and competition. Robust quantitative analysis produces results 
suggesting a positive role of metropolitan fragmentation in formation of cooperative 
networks among localities. The finding favors the concept of regional governance in 
absence of regional government. It also provides evidence that fragmented localities 
create local public economies through random voluntary cooperative networks as 
theorized by Parks and Oakerson’s (1989).  
Interlocal cooperation is, however, selective rather than holistic. This study finds 
that localities cooperate with their neighbors on the issues of growth and economic 
development but not on issues that involve land use policies, desegregation, and income 
redistribution. The skepticism expressed by Norris (2001) about selective cooperation 
among localities is found to be valid. Localities easily cooperate on issues of common 
interests and not on those involving competitive individual benefits. They are found to 
contribute towards strengthening regional economy when they collectively face economic 




of urban amenities. This is a strong indication that economic growth has regional 
footprint to which the economies of individual localities are tied, as suggested by Savitch 
et al. (1993).  
While this research does not separately analyze cooperation related to systems-
maintenance and lifestyle services, it uses measures of local characteristics, some of 
which represent lifestyle choices of residents. Property value is a proxy for the residents’ 
lifestyle choices as it translates into local revenue and better urban infrastructure. The 
finding that localities with higher property values engage in less interlocal cooperation is 
a strong indication that lifestyle amenities are not on the bargaining table.  
Local economic development has been conventionally seen as a competitive 
policy arena. Localities have been theorized to engage in aggressive developmental 
activities through which they attract residents and businesses to achieve a competitive 
edge against their neighbors. According to Peterson (1981) increased developmental 
activities in metropolitan-regions signify higher levels of competition among localities. 
The findings of this study show benefits of scale-economies and shared risks on 
investments accrued through interlocal cooperation outweigh smaller gains from 
competitive economic development.  In contrast with Peterson’s (1981) hypothesis, 
localities with thriving technology- and growth-sectors are found to engage in interlocal 
cooperation for economic development. 
Racial makeup and wealth distribution across metropolitan regions influence how 
localities interact with one another. Localities with majority white population have been 
found to disapprove of interlocal cooperation, whereas African Americans have been 




white flight from the city centers, white antipathy towards interlocal cooperation is hardly 
a surprise. However, theories claiming aversion of the African-Americans toward 
interlocal cooperation based on fear of political dilution needs a closer evaluation. Such 
an aversion probably exists against local government consolidations but not against 
voluntary cooperation where local autonomy is not threatened.  Rather than racial 
prejudices, poverty among minority population influences interlocal cooperation. Higher 
percentage of poor people has been found to positively influence interlocal cooperation 
whereas higher percentage of rich people is found not to.  
 
Implications for Academic Research 
This comprehensive study has far reaching implications in the fields of urban 
politics, metropolitan governance, interlocal relations, and local economic development. 
It plays an important role in validating relationships posited by its predecessors and 
identifying new ones.  
Literature on urban political economy and urban governance generally link 
metropolitan fragmentation with jurisdictional competition, negative externalities, and 
socio-economic inequity. Regional consolidation of local political powers is generally 
prescribed as magical remedy to those problems. This study strives to move focus from 
structural reform of urban governments to non structural solutions based on voluntary 
networks. Findings from this research highlight a new aspect of metropolitan 
fragmentation–its role in increasing possibilities for cooperative networks among urban 




This study further extends the argument to cooperation among localities in 
developmental-sector. Prevailing urban theories and a majority of scholarly works 
consider that urban localities compete with one another for economic resources. The city-
limits theory even argues that localities in fragmented urban regions have no alternative 
to zero-sum competition. This study not only provides ample evidence of local 
cooperation in developmental activities, it initiates scholarly discussion about how cities 
transform from competitors to cooperators as their economy transitioned from 
manufacturing to information-technology and services. 
Selective cooperation among urban localities is another key implication to be 
drawn from the findings of this analysis. Although, research hypotheses are only focused 
on the effects of economic distress on interlocal cooperation, the study generates findings 
that have far-reaching significance. Localities cooperate in various policy sectors, most 
common of which is urban utilities such as water supply, sewage treatment, snow 
removal, solid waste management and the like that are commonly referred to as systems-
management services (Williams, 1967). Cooperation on production of such services 
accrue benefits due to economy of scale. Localities find it difficult to cooperate in 
lifestyle services such as urban parks, recreational facilities, security and policing, and 
the like because common consumption of those services create free-rider problem. 
Cooperation in developmental activities such as construction and maintenance of city 
roads, public transit, ports, airports, sports arenas, convention centers, and the like is 
dependent on the need for and the financial capacity of individual localities. Even though 
this study does not differentiate between various arenas for cooperation, the findings of 




Limitations of This Study 
Just as with any quantitative study based on a large database, the results produced 
by this study can be confidently generalized. However, comprehensiveness sometimes 
blurs low-level details, and this research is not an exception to that risk. Other 
methodological issues such as sample type, measurement of variables, and data sources 
are some of the limitations of this study. 
Findings of this study are based on analysis of large aggregate data. Data 
aggregation may inflate or deflate the influence of a variable, especially when the data is 
not normally distributed. A randomly selected pair of localities might not show the same 
magnitude and direction of relationships as predicted by the generalized model. It would 
require a pair-wise analysis of select individual localities to evaluate individual 
characteristics. This research can serve as a starting point for scholars interested in 
conducting such pairwise studies. 
This research uses information about localities within 51 largest metropolitan 
areas. This selection method removes mid-sized metropolitan areas and small 
micropolitan areas from the analysis. In the case of some variables such as Gini 
coefficient, limiting the study to only 51 metropolitan areas has failed to produce 
sufficient variation, thus reducing the chances of getting significant robust coefficients. 
 
Avenues for Further Research 
This manuscript uses a substantially large dataset to study the influence of local 
characteristics on interlocal cooperation so that the findings can be generalized. In an 




variable that captures all types of interlocal cooperation. Future research should avoid 
some of the following methodological limitations associated with this study. 
 
Measuring non-monetary cooperation 
This study uses interlocal revenue transfer as the dependent variable that 
measures the extent of cooperative activities between local governments that involve 
monetary exchange. However, local governments also engage in cooperation that does 
not require exchange of funds. Cooperative activities between neighboring localities such 
as implementation of similar land use policies and adoption of uniform tax rates are not 
reflected in monetary transfer between them. Similarly, if localities provide different 
services of comparable monetary value across each other’s jurisdictions, they engage in 
cooperation without having to exchange money. Cooperative activities that do not 
involve monetary transfer are not included in this analysis. Cooperation that does not 
require monetary transfer seems much easier to materialize since it does not necessitates 
fiscal commitments. Future research using a more appropriate measure for the dependent 
variable can provide better insight on non-monetary cooperation between localities.  
 
Interlocal expenditure as a measure of cooperation 
The use of interlocal revenue as the dependent variable also limits this research to 
only those localities that report receiving money from other local governments. When a 
locality provides urban services to neighboring localities, it receives payments in the 
form of revenue. A locality that is totally dependent upon its neighbors for urban services 




recorded as interlocal expenditure. Similar research using interlocal expenditure as the 
dependent variable will complement the findings of this study. 
 
Public Authorities and Special Districts as institutions for indirect cooperation 
This study measures cooperation between general-purpose governments. 
However, a majority of urban services are provided by special districts and public 
authorities. Many local governments are delegating their service production and even 
provision responsibilities on these semi-public institutions. Such institutions are more 
active in the metropolitan centers where local governments are in close proximity with 
each other. Role of public authorities and special districts in cooperative urban 
governance is not evaluated in this study.  Future research can be focused on measuring 
the extent of the public services provided by the general-purpose governments and 
compare that to those provided by the special purpose governments. Considering that the 
special purpose governments have multi-jurisdictional operating boundaries, they make it 
possible for localities to engage indirectly into collective action. This is the least studied 








                                                     
1
 2012 American Community Survey 5-year estimates 
2
 Definition obtained from the Census Bureau’s official web portal 
http://www.census.gov/govs/go/municipal_township_govs.html 
3
 Post (2002) uses number of governments per square mile as a measure. I chose to use 
number per 100 square miles as it gives a sense of a mediocre size region. The strength 
and direction of relationship is not affected using either index. 
4
 https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/poverty-cal-in-acs.pdf 
If a family’s total income is less than the dollar value of the appropriate threshold, then 
that family and every individual in it are considered to be in poverty. Similarly, if an 
unrelated individual’s total income is less than the appropriate threshold, then that 
individual is considered to be in poverty. Poverty thresholds do not vary geographically. 
They are updated annually to allow for changes in the cost of living (inflation factor) 
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
5
 A Gini coefficient for analysis between localities within MSAs has been calculated 
using the number of households that fall within census-designated income categories. All 
households within a particular income cohort are assumed to be earning the median-
dollar value of their respective income range. This calculation method was  developed by 





                                                                                                                                                              
 
Where, u is the average income of population, Pi is the income rank P of household i, 
with income X. The richest household (with highest median dollar value) receives a rank 
of 1 and the poorest a rank of N. A Gini coefficient comparing inequalities between 
MSAs has been calculated using the same expression shown previously with the only 
difference being the use of per capita personal income for each MSA to calculate the 
index. 
5
  The rationale goes back to Alfred Marshall’s economics and well beyond.  These 
principles state that the clustering of functions makes industry more productive, efficient 
and innovative.  Infrastructure investment is necessary for clustering.  Also, supply-side 
economics lends its weight to infrastructure investment because it increases profits and 
furthers incentives for industry. This, in turn, leads to more economic development 
(Marshall, 1920, Porter, 1995 and Glaeser, 2011).   
6
 The Census Bureau defines the central counties as those containing all or a substantial 
portion of the urbanized area. These counties are used when measuring commuting 
patterns with other counties that qualify as outlying counties. Municipalities, cities, and 
towns that are completely or partially (majority of the area) in central counties are 
considered central cities, or central towns, and those in outlying counties are considered 
accordingly. 
7
 The analysis uses robustbase package in R statistical software. Technical 
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